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THE BRUSSELS EFFECT IN ACTION: DO THE EU’S
STANDARDS TRAVEL ABROAD? A STUDY ON CONTROL







This article examines to what extent EU law influences standards for geo-
graphical indications (GI) control beyond the EU’s regulatory borders. In light
of the concept of the “Brussels Effect” and taking a socio-legal comparative
methodological approach, it analyzes and compares how the EU and Thailand
regulate and implementGI controls in practice. The analysis of the practical im-
plementation of GI controls is based on one case study from the EU (Germany)
and two case studies from Thailand. Ultimately, this article discusses to what
extent EU GI regulations shape the regulation and practical implementation of
GI controls in Thailand. The findings indicate that Thai producers whose prod-
ucts are registered as GIs in the EU adopt the EU’s more stringent standards for
control, while fundamental differences between the EU and Thailand prevail
on the regulatory level.
Tabl e of Content s
I In troduct ion 2
I I The protect i on of G Is i n the EU
and in Tha i l and 7
I I I The Bru s s e l s E f f ect as theoret i ca l
framework 10
*Chair of Food Law, University of Bayreuth,
1
2 CAMPUS KULMBACH LEGAL WORKING PAPERS [№ 2/20
IV Methodolo gy 14
A The functional method of comparative law . . . . . . . . . 14
B Expert interviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
C Case study selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
D Data collection strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
E Data analysis strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
V Regul at i on of G I control s i n the
EU /Germany and in Tha i l and 19
A Regulation of GI controls in the EU/Germany . . . . . . . 19
1 EU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2 Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
B Regulation of GI controls in Thailand . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
C Comparison of the EU/German and the Thai regulation
of GI controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
VI Pract i ca l impl ementat ion of G I con -
trol s i n the EU /Germany and in
Tha i l and 31
A Hessischer Handkäse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1 Characteristics and supply chain . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2 Governance of controls and control measures . . . . 33
B Kao Hom Mali Thung Kula Rong-Hai . . . . . . . . . . . 36
1 Characteristics and supply chain . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2 Governance of controls and control measures . . . . 39
C Kafae Doi Chaang . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
1 Characteristics and supply chain . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2 Governance of controls and control measures . . . . 44
D Comparison of the governance and control measures of
GI controls in the EU/Germany and in Thailand . . . . . 47
VI I The i n f luence of EU GI regul at i on s
on the regul at i on and pract i ca l
impl ementat ion of G I control s i n
Tha i l and 49
VI I I Conclu s i on s and l im i tat i on s 52
I X Append i c e s 56
I I n troduct ion
In 1994 the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Agreement on Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property (hereinafter TRIPS Agreement) established
an international minimum standard for the protection of geographical indica-
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tions (GI).1 A GI is a sign, which identifies a good as originating in a particular
geographical area, with distinct characteristics in terms of quality, reputation,
or any other characteristic that are essentially attributable to its geographical
origin.2 Developing countries have shown an increased interest in GIs due to
the various benefits associated with their protection, such as the creation of
a monopoly on the brand.3 Next to establishing national systems for GI pro-
tection, some of them are also seeking legal recognition of their GI products
abroad, for example in the European Union (EU).4 Expected benefits are to
achieve enhanced access to international markets and the protection from un-
fair competition.5
To achieve and maintain registration, applicants from third countries
have to meet the EU’s requirements for quality control, even if these are gov-
erned differently in the country of origin.6 Previous literature on the gover-
nance of GI controls suggests that the approaches towards control differ be-
tween the EU and developing countries.7 In the EU, Fernández-Barcala et al.
compared the supply chains of specificGI products with those of products only
bearing a private trademark.8 They find that the former are characterized by
an extra level of public governance. Gangjee critically assessed the certification
1 T. Cottier, The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, in
The World Trade Organ i z at i on : L egal , E conom ic and
Pol i t i ca l Analys i s Volume I 1061, (P. F. J. Macrory, et al. eds., 2005).
2 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Mar-
rakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C. Art. 22 (1)
3 C. Bramley, A Review of the Socio-Economic Impact of Geographical Indica-
tions: Considerations for the Developing World, WIPO Worldwide Symposium
on Geographical Indications June 22-24 2011, Lima, Peru (2011), available at
http://193.5.93.81/edocs/mdocs/geoind/en/wipo_geo_lim_11/wipo_geo_lim_11_9.pdf.
4 D. Troskie & E. Biénabe, Institution Building and Local Industry Dynamics: Lessons
from theRooibosGI Initiative, inDeve lop i ng Geograph i ca l Ind i cat i on s
i n the S ou th . The S ou thern Afr i can Exper i ence 104-105, (C.
Bramley, et al. eds., 2013); C. Heath, How Would Geographical Indications from Asia Fare
in Europe?, inGeograph i ca l Ind i cat i on s at the Cro s sroad s of
Trade , Deve lopment, and Culture . Fo cu s on As ia Pac i f i c
186, (I. Calboli & N.-L. Wee-Loon eds., 2017).
5 H. Ilbert &M. Petit, Are Geographical Indications a Valid Property Right? Global Trends and
Challenges, 27 Deve lopment Pol i c y R ev i ew , 518 (2009).
6 G. E. Evans,TheComparative Advantages of Geographical Indications and Community Trade
Marks for the Marketing of Agricultural Products, 29 Yearbook of European
L aw 224, 250-251 (2010).
7 Delphine Marie-Vivien, The Role of the State in the Protection of Geographical Indications:
From Disengagement in France/Europe to Significant Involvement in India, 13 The Jour -
na l of World Int e l l ectual Propert y 121 (2010).
8 Marta Fernández-Barcala, et al., Contrasting the Governance of Supply Chains with and
without Geographical Indications: Complementarity Between Levels, 22 Su pply Cha in
Management : An Int ernat ional Journal 305 (2017).
4 CAMPUS KULMBACH LEGAL WORKING PAPERS [№ 2/20
of provenance and authenticity of GIs by public authorities.9 Marie-Vivien et
al. studied the governance of GI controls at the country-level (France) and
observe that a shift from public to private governance through third-party cer-
tification of GIs has taken place.10 The authors attribute this shift to the rising
“internationalization” and “standardization” of GIs and their increased associ-
ation with other voluntary (private) food standards.11
In developing countries, issues regarding the establishment of GI qual-
ity control systems due to insufficient legal frameworks and/or a lack of effec-
tive infrastructure for governing GIs have frequently been pointed out.12 On
the one hand, private approaches to governing GI controls could fill this gap
and enable developing country producers’ access to the EU GI market despite
a lack of public involvement in the governance of controls.13 Higher standards
and stricter control requirements can indeed improve producers’ capabilities
to access internationalmarkets and hence be a catalyst for trade.14 On the other
hand, producers might have limited access to private certification in the first
place15, in particular due to high costs of compliance.16 Both effects (market ac-
cess and market closure) trigger legal responses in various legal systems.17 The
9 D. S. Gangjee, Proving Provenance? Geographical Indications Certification and its Ambigui-
ties, 98 World Deve lopment , 12 (2017).
10 Delphine Marie-Vivien, et al., Are French Geographical Indications Losing their Soul? Ana-
lyzing Recent Developments in theGovernance of the Link to theOrigin in France, 25WORLD
DEVELOPMENT (2017).
11 Id. at. 25, 31.
12 Sachin Chaturvedi, India, the European Union and Geographical Indications: Conver-
gence of Interests and Challenges Ahead, 4 S ou th As ia E conom ic Journal
99, 108 (2003); J. Hughes, Coffee and Chocolate – Can we Help Developing Country
Farmers Through Geographical Indications? , A Report Prepared for the International
Intellectual Property Institute, Washington, D.C.(2009), available at http://iipi.org/wp-
content/uploads/2010/09/Coffee-and-Chocolate-J.-Hughes.pdf; Y. Pai & T. Singla, ’Vanity
GIs’: India’s Legislation on Geographical Indications and the Missing Regulatory Framework,
inGeograph i ca l Ind i cat i on s at the Cro s sroad s of Trade ,
Deve lopment, and Culture . Fo cu s on As ia - Pac i f i c 344-346, (I.
Calboli & N.-L. Wee-Loon eds., 2017); I. Calboli, Geographical Indications between Trade,
Development, Culture, and Marketing: Framing a Fair(er) System of Protection in the Global
Economy?, inGeograph i ca l Ind i cat i on s b etween Trade , Deve l -
opment, and Culture . Fo cu s on As ia - Pac i f i c 22, (I. Calboli &
N.-L. Wee-Loon eds., 2017).
13 S. Marette, et al., Recent International and Regulatory Decisions About Geographical Indica-
tions, 24 Agr i bu s i n e s s , 465-466 (2008).
14 S. Jaffee & S. Henson, Standards and Agro-Food Exports from Developing Countries: Re-
balancing the Debate 3 (2004).
15 Marette, et al., Agr i bu s i n e s s , 466 (2008).
16 K.E. Maskus, et al., Do Foreign Product Standards Matter? Impacts on Costs for Developing
Country Exporters, 20As ia - Pac i f i c Journal of Account ing & Eco -
nom i c s , 37-57 (2013).
17 K. Purnhagen, Mapping Private Regulation - Classification, Market Access and Market Clo-
sure Policy and Law’s Response, 49 Journal of World Trade (2015).
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potential and difficulties for developing countries and their producers arising
from compliance with different types of public and private standards from in-
dustrialized countries has been widely investigated in the context of agri-food
standards.18 However, it has received less scholarly attention in the context of
GIs.
The question arises how GI controls are governed and implemented in
practice in developing countries seeking to register their domestic GIs in the
EU, hence being required to comply with the EU’s control standards for GIs.
Marie-Vivien and Vagneron recently analyzed the systems for GI certification
and control in place in four countries in South-East Asia (Thailand, Vietnam,
Laos and Cambodia) and the options for the further institutionalization and
operationalization of these systems.19 They hypothesize that certification and
verification systems in these countries are likely to be shaped by the rules in
place in foreign markets such as the EU, which are considered lucrative export
markets for GI products.20
This article builds on the hypothesis of Marie-Vivien and Vagneron.
Focusing on Thailand, we examine to what extent the system of GI controls
in Thailand is shaped by EU GI regulations. Going beyond existing literature,
we pay particular attention to the link between EU governance of GI controls
and that of foreign GIs when the latter are registered as GIs in the EU. Next
to analyzing the governance of GI controls on the regulatory level, we exam-
ine their practical implementation throughout the supply chains of specific GI
products in the EU and in Thailand, for the latter focusing on products which
18 E. Biénabe, et al., Quality-Driven Market Innovations: Social and Equity Consider-
ations 135-136 (E. Coudel, et al. eds., Wageningen Academic Publishers 2013); J. E.
Hobbs, Public and Private Standards for Food Safety and Quality: International Trade Im-
plications, 11 The E st ey Centre Journal of Int ernat ional L aw
and Trade Pol i c y , 146-147 (2010); Spencer Henson & John Humphrey, Under-
standing the Complexities of Private Standards in Global Agri-Food Chains as They Impact
Developing Countries, 46 The Journal of Deve lopment Stud i e s 1628,
1641-1643 (2010); Jaffee & Henson, 1-44. 2004; Maskus, et al., A s ia - Pac i f i c Jour -
na l of Account ing & Econom ic s , 37-57 (2013); F. Cafaggi & P. Iamiceli,
SupplyChains, ContractualGovernance andCertificationRegimes, 37 European Jour -
na l of L aw and Econom ic s 131, 131-173 (2014); Sven M. Anders & Julie A.
Caswell, Standards as Barriers Versus Standards as Catalysts: Assessing the Impact ofHACCP
Implementation onU.S. Seafood Imports, 91Amer i can Journal of Agr i cu l -
tural E conom ic s 310, 310-321 (2009); Julio A. Berdegué, et al., Central American
Supermarkets’ Private Standards of Quality and Safety in Procurement of Fresh Fruits and
Vegetables, 30 Fo od Pol i c y 254, 245-246 (2005); Stefano Ponte & Peter Gibbon, Qual-
ity Standards, Conventions and the Governance of Global Value Chains, 34 E conomy
and S o c i et y 1, 1-31 (2005); S. Henson, The Role of Public and Private Standards in
Regulating International FoodMarkets, 4 Journal of Int ernat ional Agr i -
cu ltural Trade and Deve lopment (2007).
19 D. Marie-Vivien & I. Vagneron, One Size Fits All Or Tailor-Made? Building Appropriate
Certification Systems for Geographical Indications in Southeast Asia, 3 World Food
Pol i c y , 105 (2017).
20 Id. at, 108.
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are registered as protected designation of origin (PDO) or protected geograph-
ical indication (PGI)21 in the EU.
Thailand is the focus as it is considered a pioneer for GI protection
and it is the South-East Asian country which currently has achieved the reg-
istration of the largest number of products as PDO/PGI under the European
framework.22 We analyze GIs for agricultural products and foodstuffs as only
such products from Thailand have been registered as PDO/PGI in the EU to
date.23
The research objective is to compare the regulation and practical im-
plementation of GI controls for agricultural products and foodstuffs in the
EU and in Thailand. The ultimate aim is to analyze to what extent the regu-
lation and practical implementation of GI controls for agricultural products
and foodstuffs in Thailand – for products which are protected as PDO/PGI
in the EU – are shaped by EU requirements for GI control. We address the
following research questions:
1. How are GI controls for agricultural products and foodstuffs
regulated in the EU and in Thailand?
2. HowareGI controls for agricultural products and foodstuffs implemented
in practice in the EU and in Thailand, in the latter case for products reg-
istered as PDO/PGI under EU law?
3. To what extent is the regulation and practical implementation of GI con-
trols for agricultural products and foodstuffs in Thailand shaped by EU
GI regulations?
The empirical analysis bases on the concept of the “Brussels Effect”. The
concept holds that due to a variety of factors, the EU is able to externalize its
stringent standards in internationally contested regulatory fields to other juris-
dictions where more lenient standards prevail.24 Considering the EU’s strive
for stricter GI regulation on the international level and Thailand’s increased
interest in protecting domestic GIs abroad, this theory provides a useful frame-
work to analyze to what extent the EU’s rules regarding GI controls are exter-
nalized to Thailand.
21 PDOs and PGIs are defined in Article 5 (1) and (2) of “Regulation 1151/2012 of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council of 21 November 2012 on quality schemes for agricul-
tural products and foodstuffs”. Essentially, the difference between them derives from the
requirements in terms of their link to a particular geographical area, which are stricter for
PDOs than for PGIs.
22 European Commission, eAmbrosia – The EU Geographical Indications Register,
EC.EUROPA.EU, https://ec.europa.eu/info/food-farming-fisheries/food-safety-and-
quality/certification/quality-labels/geographical-indications-register/ (last updated March
27, 2020).
23 Id. at.
24 see, for example, A. Bradford,TheBrussels Effect, 107Northwe st ern Un iv er s i t y
L aw Rev i ew , 1-68 (2012).
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To answer the research questions, we take a socio-legal comparative
approach. We apply the functional method of comparative law and social sci-
ences methods.25 Next to conducting a functional comparison of the EU and
the Thai regulatory systems for GI controls, qualitative semi-structured expert
interviews and desk research are carried out. As cases, we have selected two
Thai products which are registered as PGIs in the EU. These are the rice variety
Khao Hom Thung Kula Ron-Hai (hereinafter referred to as TKR) originating
from an area extending over five provinces in the Northeast of Thailand26 and
the coffee productKafaeDoiChaang originating from theChiangRai province.
In the EU, the cheese variety Hessischer Handkäse from the German Federal
State of Hesse is chosen as a case to study the practical implementation of GI
controls in the EU.
The structure of the article is as follows: Wefirst provide background in-
formation on the legal frameworks for GI protection in the EU and inThailand.
We then outline the theoretical framework of the research. Tthe researchmeth-
ods, case selection, data collection and data analysis strategies are explained.
We analyze and compare the regulation of GI controls in the EU/Germany
and in Thailand, as well as its implementation in practice for the specific case
studies in Germany and Thailand. Following, we examine to what extent the
regulation and practical implementation of GI controls for agricultural prod-
ucts and foodstuffs in Thailand is shaped by EU GI regulations. The article
finally summarizes and critically discusses the findings and ends with conclud-
ing remarks.
I I The protect i on of G Is i n the EU and in
Tha i l and
On the European level, GI regulation emerged in the late twentieth century. In
the context of a major reform of the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)
in 1992, the focus of the EU’s agricultural policy shifted to the increased consid-
eration of quality aspects.27 Against this background, an EU-wide sui generis
system for the protection of geographical indications was established. A sui
generis system of GI protection implies that a distinct legal framework for the
protection of GIs is created28, as opposed to a system in which GIs are regu-
25 M.VanHoecke, Methodology of Comparative Legal Research, 12 L aw and Method ,
16-18 (2015).
26 Thearea of origin extends over parts of the provinces Roi Et, Surin, Sisaket, Maharasakham,
and Yasothon.
27 M. Gragnani, The Law of Geographical Indications in the EU, 7 Journal of Int e l -
l e ctual Propert y L aw & Pract i c e 271, 272 (2012).
28 B . O’Connor , The L aw of Geograph i ca l Ind i cat i on s 74-93
(Cameron May Ltd. 2004).
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Figure 1: EU PDO and PGI logos
PDO PGI
Source: https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/quality/schemes_en
lated through an existing regulatory framework, such as trademark or unfair
competition law.29
In 1992, “Regulation 2081/1992 on the protection of geographical in-
dications and designations of origin for agricultural products and foodstuffs”
was adopted.30 Regulation 2081/1992 has since been amended by “Regulation
510/2006 on the protection of geographical indications and designations of ori-
gin for agricultural products and foodstuffs” and by “Regulation 1151/2012 on
quality schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs” which is currently in
force.31
In March 2020, 1445 agricultural products and foodstuffs from within
and 27 from outside the EU were registered as PDO/PGI under the framework
of this Regulation.32 They carry either the EU’s PDO or PGI label, which are
depicted in Figure 1 above. Next to agricultural products and foodstuffs, GI
29 Id. at, 68, 70-72.
30 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2081/92 of 14 July 1992 on the Protection of Geographical
Indications and Designations of Origin for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, 1992 O.J.
(L208/1).
31 Council Regulation (EC) No 510/2006 of 20March 2006 on the Protection of Geographical
Indications and Designations of Origin for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, 2006 O.J.
(L 93/12); Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
21 November 2012 on Quality Schemes for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, 2012 O.J.
(L343/1).
32 European Commission, eAmbrosia – The EU Geographical Indications Register,
EC.EUROPA.EU, https://ec.europa.eu/info/food-farming-fisheries/food-safety-and-
quality/certification/quality-labels/geographical-indications-register/ (last updated March
27, 2020).
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Figure 2: Thai GI logo
Source41
protection is in place for alcoholic beverages (i.e. wines33, aromatized wines34
and spirits35).
After Thailand’s ratification of the WTO’s TRIPS Agreement in 199436,
the country established a sui generis system for the protection of GIs.37 In
2003, the “Act on Protection of Geographical Indication B.E. 2546)”38 (here-
inafter referred to as Thai GI Act) was adopted, which is the principal legal act
regulating GIs in Thailand. Besides agricultural products and foodstuffs, the
Thai GI Act covers the protection of handicraft and industrial products.39 In
August 2018, a total number of 115 GIs were registered in Thailand, 99 of which
are Thai GIs and 16 are foreign GIs protected in Thailand.40 Figure 2 depicts
the Thai GI logo.
33 See Council Regulation (EC) No 491/2009 of 25 May 2009 Amending Regulation (EC) No
1234/2007 Establishing a Common Organisation of Agricultural Markets and on Specific
Provisions for Certain Agricultural Products (Single CMO Regulation), 2009 O.J. (L 154/1).
34 See Regulation (EU) No 251/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26
February 2014 on the Definition, Description, Presentation, Labelling and the Protection of
Geographical Indications of AromatisedWine Products and Repealing Council Regulation
(EEC) No 1601/91, 2014 O.J. (L 84/14).
35 See Regulation (EC) No 110/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 Jan-
uary 2008 on the Definition, Description, Presentation, Labelling and the Protection of
Geographical Indications of Spirit Drinks and Repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No
1576/89, 2008 O.J. (L39/16).
36 P. Lertdhamtewe, The Protection of Geographical Indications in Thailand, 17 The Jour -
na l of World Int e l l ectual Propert y , 36 (2014).
37 Id. at, 116-120.
38 (Unofficial) Act on Protection of Geographical Indication B.E.2546(2003) (Thai.), available
at https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/th/th023en.pdf.
39 Id. at. Section 3 para. 3
40 Department of Intellectual Property, Geographical Indications Which Were Signed in
2004-2018 (From 28. April 2004 Until 30. August 2018) (in Thai)(2018), available at
http://www.ipthailand.go.th/th/.
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I I I The Bru s s e l s E f f ect as theoret i ca l
framework
The concept of the “Brussels Effect” provides the theoretical framework for
our research 42 It builds on the idea that under certain conditions, the EU
is able to externalize its stringent laws and regulations outside its borders to
other countries through market mechanisms, resulting in the globalization of
its standards.43 This effect has been discussed in various, often internationally
contested, regulatory fields such as emission trading, chemicals, data protec-
tion or food safety.44 We apply this theory to a new context, namely the regula-
tory field of GIs. Based on the theory we hypothesize that the Thai regulatory
system for GI controls and its practical implementation for Thai GI products
which are registered as PDO/PGI in the EU are influenced by EU GI control
regulations, and that the EU is thereby able to export its standards for GI con-
trol to third countries.
We hypothesize the presence of a Brussels Effect since other external
factors which could be considered to explain the Thai regulatory approach do
not hold in this case. Alternative factors which could explain Thailand’s adop-
tion of EU GI control standards could be its endeavors to comply with the
WTO and international trade agreements. Even though Thailand established
a system for the protection of GIs due to its obligations under theWTOTRIPS
Agreement, WTO law leaves open which kind of system for GI protection a
member should implement. Another explanation for the Thai regulatory stan-
dards, and another way for the EU to export its standards to third countries
than through the Brussels effect, could be Thailand’s endeavors to comply with
trade agreements. TheEUhas indeed concluded a number of trade agreements
with third countries which include provisions on GI protection.45 However, to
date and to our knowledge, no trade agreement exists between the EU and
42 Bradford, Northwe st ern Un iv er s i t y L aw Rev i ew , 3 (2012).
43 Bradford, Northwe st ern Un iv er s i t y L aw Rev i ew , 3 (2012).
44 J. Scott, From Brussels With Love: The Transatlantic Travels of European Law and the Chem-
istry of Regulatory Attraction, 57 The Amer i can Journal of Compara -
t i v e L aw , 897-942 (2009); G. Shaffer, The Power of EU Collective Action: The Impact of
EU Data Privacy Regulation on US Business Practice, 5 European L aw Journal ,
419-437 (1999); G. Shaffer, Globalization and Social Protection: The Impact of EU and Inter-
national Rules in the Ratcheting Up of U.S. Privacy Standards, 25 Ya l e Journal of
Int ernat ional L aw , 1-88 (2000); Bradford, Northwe st ern Un iv er s i t y
L aw Rev i ew , 1-68 (2012); Yoshiko Naiki, Assessing Policy Reach: Japan’s Chemical Pol-
icy Reform in Response to the EU’S REACH Regulation, 22 Journal of Env i ron -
mental L aw 171(2010); E. Fahey, The EU Emission Trading Scheme and the Court of
Justice: the High Politics of the indirect promotion of global standards, 13 German L aw
Journal (2012).
45 For example, the EU – Vietnam and EU – Singapore trade agree-
ments. See https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1922;
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1827
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Thailand through which the EU could have exported its standards for GI pro-
tection to Thailand.
A more likely explanation for the application of EU GI control stan-
dards by Thailand is hence a concept identified by Anu Bradford as the Brus-
sels Effect. Anu Bradford has identified five conditions which she argues must
all be met for such an extra-territorialization effect to occur: Market power,
regulatory capacity, the preference for strict rules, a predisposition to regulate
inelastic targets and the non-divisibility of standards.46 She defines market
power in terms of the market size of the standard-setting jurisdiction47 (in this
research, the EU) and understands regulatory capacity as „institutional struc-
tures that are capable of producing and enforcing regulations effectively“.48 The
preference for strict rules refers to domestic political preferences for stringent
regulatory standards49, while the pre-disposition to regulate inelastic targets
implies that the targets of regulation cannot simply be moved to another ju-
risdiction (e.g. consumers).50 Finally, the non-divisibility of standards means
that producers in third countries decide to apply the EU’s stricter standards not
only to their production that is targeting the EUmarket but to their worldwide
production based on considerations of economies of scale.51 While Bradford
implies that for the Brussels Effect to occur these conditions need to be cu-
mulatively met, follow-up research has found that in practice the effect occurs
with only some of the criteria being fulfilled.52
Applying these conditions to GIs, we assume that the EU has consid-
erable market power. This is due to the size of its internal market and to the
high level of protection granted to GIs and the presence of a consumer base
increasingly demanding differentiated food products.53 We consider the EU’s
requirements for the control of PDOs/PGIs a standard which, despite being
voluntary, producers in Thailand have tomeet if they wish to gain access to the
EU’s market for GIs. Since, internationally, the EU has in place the institution-
allymost developed system forGI registration54, we assume that this holds true
for the EU’s system of GI controls as well. Consequently, we expect that the
EU’s control standards are higher than those in other jurisdictions. Compared
to other, non-GI products, the EU market for GIs is a niche market which as
46 Bradford, Northwe st ern Un iv er s i t y L aw Rev i ew , 10-19 (2012).
47 Id. at, 11.
48 Id. at, 10.
49 Id. at, 14.
50 Id. at, 16-17.
51 Id. at, 17.
52 D. Sinopoli & K. P. Purnhagen, Reversed Harmonization or Horizontalization of Stan-
dards?: Does WTO Law Facilitate or Constrain the Brussels Effect?, WISCONSIN INTER-
NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, 92-119 (2016).
53 E. Dimara & D. Skuras, Consumer Demand for Informative Labeling of Quality Food and
DrinkProducts: a EuropeanUnionCase Study, 22 Journal of Con sumer Mar -
k et i ng , 96 (2005).
54 Gangjee, World Deve lopment , 13 (2017).
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such is small in terms of the volume of products produced andmarketed. How-
ever, since GI products are not substitutable with other products in the market
due to their unique features, the EU’s market power for a product registered as
GI in the EU can be considered large. Only the products produced according
to the product specification can be sold on this market and especially for GIs
from third countries, there is little competitive pressure due to the low number
of registered products. Importantly, for this study, we define the EU’s market
power for GIs in the latter sense.
Next, the EU and its member states have the regulatory capacity to ef-
fectively establish and enforce GI standards. The EU also has a clear preference
for strict rules regarding GI protection.55 Moreover, because GIs are a con-
sumer good, the regulatory target cannot be moved to another jurisdiction. It
is less clear whether GIs from Thailand are non-divisible. It may be that only
a small share of the producers’ output is determined for the EU market, while
the rest of it is sold on the national market or is exported to non-EU foreign
markets where more lenient standards for GI control prevail, not making it
worthwhile to adopt the EU’s standards for their entire production.
According to Bradford, firms wishing to access the EU’s market face
two options: To either comply with the EU’s more stringent standards, or to
entirely forgo itsmarket.56 The theory holds that the implication of compliance
can be a de facto or a de jure Brussels Effect. The de facto effect implies that
businesses outside of the EU adapt their business practices to the EU’s rules
and apply them to their entire production.57 The de jure effect means that
those firms which have adapted to the EU’s standards lobby their national gov-
ernments to adopt domestic regulatory standards which meet the higher level
of EU laws to avoid a competitive disadvantage on the domestic market.58 The
distinction between the de facto and de jure effects represents the two levels of
analysis in this research, namely that of the regulation of GI controls in the EU
and inThailand (de jure) and their implementation in practice on the producer
level (de facto).
The de facto and the de jure Brussels Effect can eventually lead to a
‘trading up’ of standards on the global level.59 As noted before, the implica-
tions of rising standards for GI controls for producers in developing countries
seem ambiguous as they may result in both, market access and market clo-
sure.60 This suggests that if standards for GI controls are subject to ‘trading
55 T. Josling, The War on Terroir: Geographical Indications as a Transatlantic Trade Conflict, 57
Journal of Agr i cu ltural E conom ic s , 343-346 (2006).
56 Bradford, Northwe st ern Un iv er s i t y L aw Rev i ew , 5 (2012).
57 Id. at, 6.
58 Id. at.
59 D. Voge l , Trad ing up : Con sumer and Env i ronmental R eg -
u l at i on in a Global E conomy (Harvard University Press. 1995).
60 Purnhagen, Journal of World Trade , (2015).
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up’, it is questionable whether this development is actually desirable for devel-
oping country producers and what the practical implications would be.
According to Bradford there are several limitations which can prevent
a Brussels Effect from occurring.61 These can be internal62 or external63 factors.
Internal constraints arise when the EUmember states fail to agree on common
regulatory goals due to internal diversity or conflicts between them.64 The EU
member states dedicate differing levels of efforts to the protection of GIs. How-
ever, as the current standards for GI protection and control were agreed upon
by all member states in Regulation 1151/2012, internal disparities are unlikely to
limit the externalization of the EU’s standards as long as Regulation 1151/2012
is in force.
The external factors relate to constraints imposed by market mecha-
nisms, i.e. the rise of alternative markets65, efforts by other states to constrain
the EU’s regulatory activity66, as well as the influence of international institu-
tions.67 Regarding the latter, Bradford specifically discusses the ability of the
WTO to challenge the EU’s strict regulations.68 In the context of GIs, the out-
come of the WTO GI dispute suggests that the WTO and other member states
do have some ability to constrain the EU’s regulatory power in the field of GIs.
69
In 2003, the US and Australia filed a complaint at the WTO to deter-
mine whether the EU’s methods of GI protection were in line with the TRIPS
Agreement. 70 Amongst other things, they alleged that the EU only allowed
GIs from third countries to be registered in the EUwhen the third country had
in place inspection arrangements for GIs which were equivalent to those of the
EU.71 The complainants argued that this provision violated the national treat-
ment principle in Article 3 (1) of the TRIPS Agreement.72 Handler notes that
61 Bradford, Northwe st ern Un iv er s i t y L aw Rev i ew , 48-63 (2012).
62 Id. at, 57-63.
63 Id. at, 48-56.
64 Id. at, 57-63.
65 Bradford, Northwe st ern Un iv er s i t y L aw Rev i ew , 48-49 (2012).
66 Id. at, 49-54.
67 Id. at, 54-56.
68 Id. at.
69 M. Handler, The WTO Geographical Indications Dispute, 69 The Modern L aw
Rev i ew (2006).
70 Panel Report, European Communities - Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indi-
cations for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs. Complaint by Australia, WT/DS290/R
(March 15, 2005); Panel Report, EuropeanCommunities - Protection of Trademarks andGe-
ographical Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs. Complaint by the United
States, WT/DS290/R (March 15, 2005).
71 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2081/92 of 14 July 1992 on the Protection of Geographical
Indications and Designations of Origin for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, 1992 O.J.
(L208/1). Art. 12
72 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Mar-
rakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C.
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“the complainants’ greater concern with the ‘equivalence […]’ condition[s] in
the Regulation was that they presented a clandestine attempt to impose Euro-
pean standards of GI protection for foodstuffs throughout the world”.73 As a
result of the WTO’s panel ruling, the EU amended its GI Regulation to bring
it in line with WTO law.74 Yet, the EU is still able to impose strict standards
on GI producers if these affect producers from within and outside of the EU
in the same way.75 This suggests that the WTO has only limited capability to
restrain a potential Brussels Effect in the field of GIs.
Before turning to the research results, we first outline the socio-legal
comparative methodological approach towards answering the research ques-
tions.
IV Methodolo gy
Our research draws on the functional method of comparative law, the method
of qualitative expert interviews aswell as desk research. We explain thesemeth-
ods first before outlining the case selection made for the analysis of the case
studies used to analyze the implementation of GI controls in the EU and in
Thailand. Finally, we explain the data collection and analysis strategies.
A The functional method of comparative law
The functional method of comparative law focuses on studying legal solutions
provided in different jurisdictions to socio-legal problems that are encountered
in both jurisdictions in a similar or in the same way.76 Essentially, functional
comparisons study the function that certain norms, rules and legal institutions
fulfil in solving a certain problem.77 Thereby, the assumption is that in different
jurisdictions similar problems are approached with similar solutions, although
these solutions can be reached in different ways.78
73 Handler, The Modern L aw Rev i ew 78 (2006).
74 Council Regulation (EC) No 510/2006 of 20March 2006 on the Protection of Geographical
Indications and Designations of Origin for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, 2006 O.J.
(L 93/12).
75 Article 3 (1) of the TRIPS Agreement states that „[e]ach Member shall accord to the nation-
als of other Members treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own nationals
with regard to the protection of intellectual property“. This implies that producers from
third countries may not be treated differently than EU producers, but it does not prevent
the EU from setting high standards for control for both EU and third country producers.
76 R. Michaels, The Functional Method of Comparative Law, in The Oxford Hand -
bo ok of Comparat i v e L aw 369-372, (M. Reimann & R. Zimmermann eds.,
2006).
77 J. Husa, Functional Method in Comparative Law - Much Ado About Nothing?, 2 EPL J , 13-15
(2013).
78 A. E. Örücü, Methodology of Comparative Law 443 (J. M. Smits ed., Edward Elgar 2006).
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Weapplied thismethodbecause it “is very suited tomicro-level projects
due to its focus on particular social problems and their solutions”.79 We chose
this approach over other legal methodological approaches such as that of ‘le-
gal culture’, because the latter focuses on broader patterns of social behavior
and attitudes in a given society80, and less on the specifically targeted social
problems which are of interest to this research.
Contributions by several scholars suggest certain elementswhich should
be taken into account when conducting a functional comparison.81These are:
• a functional research question (e.g. how is socio-legal prob-
lem X solved?);
• defining the unit of analysis (i.e. the legal systems to be compared and
the level of comparison (micro, meso, macro)) and the unit of inquiry
(i.e. the object of comparison);
• describing the solution for problem X in both jurisdictions (can include
acquisition of data through social sciences methods);
• identifying similarities and/or differences between both jurisdictions;
• explaining the similarities and/or differences discovered and formula-
tion of hypotheses;
• a critical evaluation of the research results and embedding them into the
broader context.
The elements listed above provide for a guideline that ensure a struc-
tured analysis, yet they are not regarded as analytical steps in the strict sense.82
Thefunctionalmethodof comparative law in a ‘law-in-context’ or socio-
legal research design can be complemented by social science methods.83 Mark
van Hoecke proposes to conduct interviews with relevant stakeholders to “get
a full and concrete view of the law as it works in practice”.84 This approach suits
well the objective of our research, as the aim is not only to analyze the laws and
regulations regarding GI controls but also to understand how GI controls are
implemented in practice in the EU and in Thailand. Therefore, we drew on the
method of qualitative semi-structured expert interviews.
79 P. Mahy, The Functional Approach in Comparative Socio-Legal Research: Reflections Based
on a Study of Plural Work Regulation in Australia and Indonesia, 12 In t ernat ional
Journal of L aw in Context , 422 (2016).
80 D.Nelken,Using the Concept of Legal Culture, 29 Au stra l ian Journal of L e -
ga l Ph i lo sophy , 1-3 (2004).
81 G. Dannemann, Comparative Law: Study of Similarities or Differences?, in The Ox -
ford Handbook of Comparat i v e L aw 406-419, (M.Reimann&R.Zim-
mermann eds., 2006); Örücü, 445-449. 2006; Husa, EPL J , 15 (2013).
82 Dannemann, 406-407. 2006.
83 Mahy, In t ernat ional Journal of L aw in Context , 423 (2016).
84 Van Hoecke, L aw and Method , 30 (2015).
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B Expert interviews
Expert interviews provide orientation and knowledge about phenomena in
an underexplored field of research in a relatively short time.85 Thereby, the
method contributes to the generation, modification and testing of new theo-
ries based on empirical observations.86
Theexpert interview canbe considered a special formof a semi-structured
interview87, which is typically conducted using an interview guide.88 An inter-
view guide reflects a translation of the research problem and theoretical as-
sumptions about the research topic into interview questions, while at the same
time it is an instrument of data collection.89 Since expert interviews focus on
extracting practical and technical knowledge from the interviewee, they are
generally more structured and the questions more focused than those used for
other types of semi-structured interviews.90
C Case study selection
We took a case study approach to answer the research question on how GI
controls are implemented in practice in Thailand and in the EU. We chose a
case-based approach due to a lack of previous theoretical studies in this field
of research. The approach can hence contribute to theory building.91 In Thai-
land, we analyzed the control system of TKR and Kafae Doi Chaang. TKR and
Kafae Doi Chaang are studied in the EU’s ongoing Strength2Food project.92
We chose both cases for reasons of enhanced data access and existing expert
contacts in Thailand. In the EU, we studied the cheese variety Hessischer
Handkäse from the German Federal State of Hesse. We focus on a single mem-
ber state because the individual member states implement EU GI regulations
and it was beyond the scope of this research to study their practical implemen-
tation at different levels of operation for the entire EU. We focus on Germany
and on a product from the Federal State of Hesse due to the language skills of
85 A. Bogner, et al., Introduction: Expert Interviews – An Introduction to a New Methodological
Debate, in I n t erv i ew ing Expert s 2, (A. Bogner, et al. eds., 2009).
86 U. Fl i ck , Qual i tat i v e S oz ia l for s chung . E i n e E i n führung
27 (Burghard König ed., Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag. 2016); S . L amnek & C .
Kre l l , Qual i tat i v e S oz ia l for s chung 95-98 (Beltz Verlag 6th ed. 2016).
87 Id. at, 448.
88 C.Helfferich, Leitfaden- und Experteninterviews, inHandbuch Methoden der
emp i r i s chen S oz ia l for s chung 565-570, (N. Baur & J. Blasius eds., 2015).
89 R . Ka i s e r , Qual i tat i v e Expert en int erv i ews . Konze p t i one l l e
Grundl agen und prakt i s che Durchführung 52 (H.-G. Ehrhart, et al.
eds., Springer VS. 2014).
90 Helfferich, 571-572. 2015.
91 KathleenM. Eisenhardt,BuildingTheories fromCase StudyResearch, 14 The Academy
of Management R ev i ew , 532-550 (1989).
92 See https://www.strength2food.eu/. This research received funding from the EU’s Horizon
2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No. 678024.
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the researchers and for reasons of data access. Images of Hessischer Handkäse,
TKR and Kafae Doi Chaang are presented in Annex A.
D Data collection strategy
We conducted expert interviews with experts who are involved in the system
of GI controls directly or indirectly. We selected the interviewees based on
purposive and snowball sampling.93 In Hesse, Germany, we contacted five
stakeholders directly via e-mail and telephone (i.e. the competent authority
and processors94 of Hessischer Handkäse). A face-to-face interview was con-
ducted with one processor and with the competent authority. Moreover, we
were able to attend a GI control at the premises of a second processor.
In Thailand, the first contact was made with a researcher from Kaset-
sart University in Bangkok who is involved the EU’s Strength2Food project
and who provided the first contact details of possible interviewees. In total,
five potential interviewees were contacted via e-mail (representative of the
UN FAO Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific, two researchers, a repre-
sentative from the Department of Intellectual Property (DIP) of the Thai Min-
istry of Commerce (competent authority) and a representative from a certifi-
cation body (Bioagricert) active in Thailand). An interview via Skype could
be realized with the representative from the UN FAO Regional Office for Asia
and the Pacific and a researcher from Kasetsart University (who is involved
in the Strength2Food project). We interviewed a representative from the DIP
from the Thai Ministry of Commerce via the audio call function of the “Line”-
application. A list of all interviewees and the interview guides used for the
conversations are as available in Appendix B and Appendix C.
The interviews were conducted in October and November 2018. Each
interview lasted thirty minutes to one hour. Interviews with German stake-
holders were conducted in German. Experts from Thailand were interviewed
in English. We recorded all interview conversations after having received the
informed consent of the interviewee(s) and took additional notes by hand dur-
ing and after the interview conversation. Following, we transcribed the inter-
views and anonymized the transcriptions. The transcription was done using
the transcription rules suggested by Kuckartz95 and Jefferson96. We considered
93 Martin N Marshall, Sampling for Qualitative Research, 13 Fam i ly P ract i c e , 523
(1996).
94 Contact was made with processors only as the product specification stipulates that merely
the processing stage of the production of Hessischer Handkäse has to take place within the
specified geographical area. See Publication of an Application Pursuant to Article 6(2) of
Council Regulation (EC) No 510/2006 on the Protection of Geographical Indications and
Designations of Origin for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, 2009O.J. (C 320/47). This
will be outlined in more detail in section 6.1.1.
95 U. Kuckartz , Qual i tat i v e Inhalt sanalys e . Methoden ,
P rax i s , Compu terunter stü tzung 167-168 (Beltz Juventa 3rd ed. 2016).
96 as cited in id. at.
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applying a simple framework for transcription to be sufficient to meet the aim
of this research, as the focus is on extracting (factual) knowledge rather than
subjective opinions or feelings.
We drew information to answer the research questions from written
laws, relevant previous literature and from the internet. Our analysis of the
practical implementation of GI controls in Thailand bases on two case study
reports prepared for the EU’s Strength2Food project. These case study reports
provide an in-depth analysis of the TKR97 and Kafae Doi Chaang98 cases.
E Data analysis strategy
We used the qualitative data analysis software MAXQDA to categorize and
code the primary data collected through the expert interviews.99 We applied
the procedure for a structuring content analysis suggested by Philipp Mayring
(see Appendix D for a visualization).100 The aspects mentioned during the
interviews relevant to answer the research questions could be extracted and
separated from irrelevant information. We created the categories for analysis
based on a deductive (or a-priori) approach.101 This implies that the analytical
categories derive from the research question(s) and theoretical background,
and are created independently from the empirical data.102 We created overall
categories, which we then further split into subcategories.103 All categories and
subcategories together build the category system.104 Each category was clearly
defined and delineated to enable the coherent coding of the primary data. 105
Although the deductive approach implies that the categories are generally cre-
ated before working with the primary data, it is possible to amend the category
system at a later stage.106 The category system created for this research is pro-
vided in Appendix E.
97 O. Napasintuwong, PGI TKR Hom Mali Rice in Thailand, in SUSTA INAB IL -
IT Y OF EUROPEAN FOOD QUAL IT Y SCHEMES . MULT I -
PERFORMANCE , STRUCTURE , AND GOVERNANCE OF PDO,
PG I , AND ORGANIC AGR I - FOOD SYSTEMS 87-109, (F. Arfini & V.
Bellassen eds., 2019)
98 A. Lilavanichakul, PGI Doi Chaang Coffee in Thailand, in SUSTA INAB IL -
IT Y OF EUROPEAN FOOD QUAL IT Y SCHEMES . MULT I -
PERFORMANCE , STRUCTURE , AND GOVERNANCE OF PDO,
PG I , AND ORGANIC AGR I - FOOD SYSTEMS 287-302, (F. Arfini & V.
Bellassen eds., 2019).
99 Fl i ck , 386-421. 2016.
100 P. Mayr ing , Qual i tat i v e Inhalt sanalys e . Grundl agen und
Techn ik en 98, 104 (Beltz 12th ed. 2015).
101 Id. at, 97-99.




106 Id. at, 99.
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We extracted the information from the interview transcriptions. We
summarized, complemented and triangulated the coded material with the in-
formation obtained through laws/regulations, literature, the internet and the
Strength2Food case study reports. We summarized the data per analytical cat-
egory.107
V Regul at i on of G I control s i n the
EU /Germany and in Tha i l and
In view of answering the first research question, we first analyze and compare
the regulation of GI controls in the EU/Germany and in Thailand. As part
of the analysis we also took a detailed look at the German regulatory frame-
work for the regulation of GI controls to provide the background necessary to
understand the practical implementation of GI controls for the German case
study.
A Regulation of GI controls in the EU/Germany
1 EU
Title V, Chapter I of Regulation 1151/2012 sets out the obligations and princi-
ples for the EU’s official control system.108 The implementation of controls is a
prerequisite for registering a product’s name as PDO/PGI in the EU. The body
who will be responsible for carrying out the controls has to be indicated in the
application for the registration of a product.109
There are two aims of the official controls: First, to verify producers’110
compliance with the product specification before a product is placed on the
market.111 The costs of these controls may be transferred to the producers
which are subject to the control. 112 Second, to prevent the misuse of the
protected name in the market place.113 The scope of protection for registered
names prohibits (a) direct or indirect commercial use for products which are
not covered by registration, (b) misuse, imitation or evocation, (c) any other
false or misleading indication as to the provenance, origin, nature or essential
107 Id. at, 103.
108 Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 Novem-
ber 2012 on Quality Schemes for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, 2012 O.J. (L343/1).
109 Id. at. Art. 8 (1) (a)
110 The term producer will be used hereinafter when referring to all stakeholders of a GI prod-
uct supply chain who are subject to GI controls. This can be producers, processors, whole-
salers/retailers and traders.
111 Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 Novem-
ber 2012 on Quality Schemes for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, 2012 O.J. (L343/1).
Art. 37
112 Id. at. Art. 37 (1)
113 Id. at. Art. 38
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qualities of the product and (d) any other practice liable to mislead the con-
sumer as to the origin of the product.114
Regulation 1151/2012 delegates the responsibility of controlling thePDO/PGI
system to the EU member states. They shall designate the competent authority
or authorities that are responsible for the implementation of inspections to ver-
ify compliance with the product specification115 and the monitoring of the use
of registered names in the market.116 Public authorities carrying out controls
must offer adequate guarantees of objectivity and impartiality.117
The member state competent authorities are able to delegate control
tasks relating to the verification of producers’ compliance with the product
specification to one or more control bodies118 operating as product certifica-
tion bodies.119 These must be accredited in accordance with European stan-
dard EN 45011 or ISO/IEC Guide 65 (general requirements for bodies operat-
ing product certification systems; now ISO 17065120).121 The accreditation of
the product certification body may be conducted either by a national accred-
itation body within the EU122 or by an accreditation body from outside the
EU which is a signatory of a multilateral recognition arrangement under the
auspices of the International Accreditation Forum (IAF).123 Marie-Vivien and
Vagneron note that “the term “certification body”, introduced by the 2006 regu-
lation124, marks the inclusion of PDO/PGI in the general standards for product
certification”.125
Article 45 (1) (a) of Regulation 1151/2012 entitles producer groups to
contribute to the control tasks by “ensuring that the quality, reputation and
114 Id. at. Art. 13 (1)
115 Id. at. Art. 36 (3) (a)
116 Id. at. Art. 36 (3) (b)
117 Id. at. Art. 36 (2)
118 Within the meaning of point 5 of Article 2 of Regulation 882/2004, which defines a “con-
trol body” as “an independent third party to which the competent authority has delegated
certain control tasks”.
119 Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 Novem-
ber 2012 on Quality Schemes for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, 2012 O.J. (L343/1).
Art. 37 (1) (b), Art. 39 (1)
120 See https://www.iso.org/standard/26796.html
121 Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 Novem-
ber 2012 on Quality Schemes for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, 2012 O.J. (L343/1).
Art. 39 (2)
122 Operating in accordance with “Regulation 765/2008 setting out the requirements for ac-
creditation and market surveillance relating to the marketing of products and repealing
Regulation (EEC) No 339/93”.
123 Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 Novem-
ber 2012 on Quality Schemes for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, 2012 O.J. (L343/1).
Art. 39 (3) (a) and (b)
124 Referring to “Regulation 510/2006 on the protection of geographical indications and desig-
nations of origin for agricultural products and foodstuffs”.
125 Marie-Vivien & Vagneron, World Food Pol i c y , 110 (2017).
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authenticity of their products are guaranteed on the market (…)”,126 also com-
prising carrying out activities related to compliance of a product with the prod-
uct specification.127
Next to carrying out official controls, themember states are responsible
for enforcing the rules set out by Regulation 1151/2012 and for taking measures
in case breaches are found.128 Enforcement measures and sanctions are not
determined by Regulation 1151/2012, but “Member States shall take appropri-
ate administrative and judicial steps to prevent or stop the unlawful use” of a
PDO/PGI.129 Member states shall designate the authorities that are responsi-
ble for taking these steps according to the procedures in place in each member
state. 130
Themember states must report their control activities to the EU as part
of their single multi-annual national control plan131 in accordance with “Reg-
ulation 882/2004 on official controls performed to ensure the verification of
compliancewith feed and food law, animal health and animalwelfare rules”132.133
This report shall include information on aspects such as the results of the au-
dits, cases of non-compliance and enforcement action taken by the member
states.134
Regarding products from third countrieswhich are registered as PDO/PGI
in the EU, Regulation 1151/2012 stipulates that the verification of compliance
with the product specification before the product is placed on the market shall
be carried out either by one or more public competent authorities designated
126 Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 Novem-
ber 2012 on Quality Schemes for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, 2012 O.J. (L343/1).
Art. 45 (1) (a)
127 Id. at. Art. 45 (1) (d)
128 Id. at. Art. 13 (3), Art. 38 para. 2
129 Id. at. Art. 13 (3) para. 1
130 Id. at. Art. 13 (3) para. 2
131 The EU General Food Law (Regulation 178/2002) requires each EU member state to moni-
tor and check the implementation of food and feed law. To do so, theymust prepare amulti-
annual national control plan (see Article 41 of Regulation 882/2004). The plan sets out the
member states‘ objectives regarding the control of compliance with food and feed law and
specifies the available instruments and structures to achieve the defined objectives (see
https://www.bvl.bund.de/EN/01_Food/_01_tasks/02OfficialFoodControl/02_MANCP/MANCP_node.html).
132 see Regulation (EC)No 882/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29April
2004 on Official Controls Performed to Ensure the Verification of Compliance with Feed
and Food Law, Animal Health and Animal Welfare Rules, 2004 O.J. (L 165).
133 Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 Novem-
ber 2012 on Quality Schemes for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, 2012 O.J. (L343/1).
Art. 40 (1)
134 Id. at. Art. 40 (2); Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 29 April 2004 onOfficial Controls Performed to Ensure the Verification of Com-
pliance with Feed and Food Law, Animal Health and Animal Welfare Rules, 2004 O.J. (L
165). Art. 44
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by the third country, or by one or more product certification bodies.135 For
control bodies certifying products originating in third countries, Regulation
1151/2012 does not set out requirements as to their accreditation, although the
former GI Regulation 510/2006 explicitly required product certification bod-
ies carrying out controls for third country GIs to be accredited in accordance
with European standard EN 45011 or ISO/IEC Guide 65 as of May 1st 2010.136
Marie-Vivien and Vagneron argue that since this provision has been dropped
in the 2012 Regulation, third countries are in principle left with a range of op-
tions as to how to implement GI controls for products which are registered as
PDO/PGI in the EU. 137
2 Germany
The FederalMinistry of Justice and Consumer Protection and the FederalMin-
istry of Food and Agriculture are the competent authorities for GIs for agri-
cultural products and foodstuffs in Germany.138 The Federal Government is
responsible for policy and federal legislation on GIs. The GI control system
is decentralized.139 § 134 (1) German Trademark Act140 provides that the im-
plementation of the control tasks stipulated in EU Regulation 1151/2012 lies
with the competent authorities of the Länder.141 The Länder governments can
delegate control tasks to private control bodies or include them in the inspec-
tions.142 The control bodies are accredited by the German National Accredita-
tion Body (Deutsche Akkreditierungsstelle GmbH — DAkkS).143
§ 134 (2) of the Trade Mark Act entitles the staff of the competent au-
thorities carrying out official controls on producers producing and placing on
the market agricultural products and foodstuffs with a GI to:
135 Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 Novem-
ber 2012 on Quality Schemes for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, 2012 O.J. (L343/1).
Art. 37 (2) (a) and (b)
136 Council Regulation (EC) No 510/2006 of 20March 2006 on the Protection of Geographical
Indications and Designations of Origin for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, 2006 O.J.
(L 93/12). Art. 11 (3)
137 Marie-Vivien & Vagneron, World Food Pol i c y , 112 (2017).
138 EuropeanUnion Intellectual Property Office, Protection and Control of Geographical Indica-
tions for Agricultural Products in the EU Member States, European Union Intellectual Prop-
erty Office(December 2017), available at https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-
detail/-/publication/0c120946-6eb3-11e8-9483-01aa75ed71a1/language-en.
139 Id. at.
140 Markengesetz [MarkenG] [Trademark Act], Oct. 15 1994, BGBl. I S. 3082; 1995 I
S. 156; 1996 I S. 682, das zuletzt durch Artikel 1 des Gesetzes vom 11. Dezember
2018 (BGBl. I S. 2357) geändert worden ist (Ger.), available at https://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/markeng/BJNR308210994.html.
141 Id. at. § 134 (1)
142 Id. at. § 139 (2)
143 European Union Intellectual Property Office, 68. December 2017.
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• Enter and inspect business premises and properties, sales facilities and
means of transport144;
• Take samples145;
• View and inspect business records146;
• Request information147.
This provision applies to the controls carried out in the market place148
and for controls on imported and exported GIs.149 The control costs are ac-
cording to Article 37 (1) of Regulation 1151/2012 determined by the laws of the
Länder.150
According to the General Administrative Regulation on Framework
Controls151, the Germanmulti-annual national control plan consists of a frame-
work plan and sixteen plans for each Federal State.152 Consequently, the com-
petent authorities of the Federal States are responsible for incorporating their
control activities on GIs therein.153 The competent authorities of the Länder
are also responsible for enforcing GI law and have legal power to take action
in case of non-compliance.154 The Trade Mark Act allows administrative sanc-
tions (a regulatory fine of up to 10 000 euros) to be imposed on producers who
refuse compliance with inspectors’ requests under §134 of the Trade Mark Act
(see bullet points above).155 The highest responsible Länder authorities can ap-
ply such fines according to Article 36 (2) of the German Act on Administrative
Offences.156 The unlawful use of a GI in business activities can be punished
144 Markengesetz [MarkenG] [Trademark Act], Oct. 15 1994, BGBl. I S. 3082; 1995 I S. 156; 1996
I S. 682, das zuletzt durch Artikel 1 des Gesetzes vom 11. Dezember 2018 (BGBl. I S. 2357)
geändert worden ist (Ger.). § 134 (2) para. 1
145 Id. at. § 134 (2) para. 2
146 Id. at. § 134 (2) para. 3
147 Id. at. § 134 (2) para. 4
148 Id. at. § 134 (2)
149 Id. at. § 134 (4)
150 Id. at. § 134 (6)
151 Allgemeine Verwaltungsvorschrift über Grundsätze zur Durchführung der
amtlichen Überwachung der Einhaltung der Vorschriften des Lebensmittelrechts,
des Rechts der tierischen Nebenprodukte, des Weinrechts, des Futtermittelrechts
und des Tabakrechts [AVV Rahmen-Überwachung – AVV RÜb], June 3 2008.
Zuletzt geändert durch Verwaltungsvorschrift vom 15. Februar 2017 (BAnz
AT 17.02.2017 B3) (Ger.), available at http://www.verwaltungsvorschriften-im-
internet.de/bsvwvbund_03062008_3158100140002.htm.
152 Id. at. § 10
153 Auditors RP Giessen, personal communication, 24 October 2018.
154 European Union Intellectual Property Office, 71-72. December 2017.
155 Markengesetz [MarkenG] [Trademark Act], Oct. 15 1994, BGBl. I S. 3082; 1995 I S. 156; 1996
I S. 682, das zuletzt durch Artikel 1 des Gesetzes vom 11. Dezember 2018 (BGBl. I S. 2357)
geändert worden ist (Ger.). § 145 (3)
156 Gesetz über Ordnungswidrigkeiten [OWiG] [Act on Regulatory Offences], Feb. 19,
1987 (BGBl. I S. 602), das zuletzt durch Artikel 3 des Gesetzes vom 17. Dezem-
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Figure 3: GI control system in the EU/Germany
Source: Depiction by the authors. The thick blue arrows show the hierarchy between
stakeholders regarding GI controls (from top to bottom). The brown arrows indicate the
direction of reporting on GI controls (from right to left and bottom to top). “BMEL” stands
for Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture. “BMJV” stands for Federal Ministry of Justice
and Consumer Protection.
with up to two years of imprisonment or a criminal fine. 157 Figure 3 summa-
rizes the EU/German GI control system.
B Regulation of GI controls in Thailand
The Thai GI Act requires producers’ compliance with the GI product specifica-
tion, prohibits the unlawful use of protected names in the market, and speci-
fies the procedures and penalties in case of non-compliance with these rules.158
Section 27 of the Act deems it unlawful to (1) use a geographical indication to
show or mislead other persons as to the true origin of the good after the good
has been registered159 and to (2) “use a geographical indication in any manner
ber 2018 (BGBl. I S. 2571) geändert worden ist, available at https://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/owig_1968/BJNR004810968.html. Art. 36 (2)
157 Markengesetz [MarkenG] [Trademark Act], Oct. 15 1994, BGBl. I S. 3082; 1995 I S. 156; 1996
I S. 682, das zuletzt durch Artikel 1 des Gesetzes vom 11. Dezember 2018 (BGBl. I S. 2357)
geändert worden ist (Ger.). § 144 (1)
158 (Unofficial) Act on Protection of Geographical Indication B.E.2546(2003) (Thai.). Sections
25, 26, 27 and 39
159 Id. at. Section 27 (1)
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which causes confusion or misunderstanding as to the geographical origin of
the goods and the quality, reputation or any other characteristic of the goods
so as to cause damage to other traders”.160 However, the Thai GI Act neither
requires controls to be implemented as a prerequisite for registering a product
nor after a product has been registered.
GI controls in Thailand are only a requirement for the use of the Thai
national GI logo, which is regulated by the “Department of Intellectual Prop-
erty Regulation for Thai Geographical Indication Logo Approval B.E. 2008”
161.162 Thai producers have to apply for authorization to use the national GI
logo at the DIP.163 The DIP is the competent authority dealing with matters
concerning GI application, registration and enforcement under the Thai GI
Act.164 The DIP acts under the auspices of the Thai Ministry of Commerce.165
The authorization for the use of the national GI logo is valid for a period of two
years after which producers have to apply for renewed authorization.166 To re-
ceive authorization to use the GI logo, producers have to implement a system
of quality control.167
The“Department of Intellectual PropertyRegulation forThaiGeograph-
ical Indication Logo Approval B.E. 2008” requires users of the GI logo to estab-
lish a working manual and control plan.168 The former is the reference against
which the quality of the product will be controlled and indicates standards for
production and traceability.169 The latter determines the responsible actors,
identifies crucial points of control, specifies the corresponding methods of in-
spection and stipulates sanctions.170 Both the working manual and the control
160 Id. at. Section 27 (2)
161 This translation is based on Marie-Vivien & Vagneron, World Food Pol i c y , 113
(2017).All other translations of Thai laws and other Thai sources which are not available in
English were made using Google Translate.
162 Department of Intellectual Property Regulation for Thai Geographical Indication Logo Ap-
proval B.E. 2008 (Thai.), available at https://www.ipthailand.go.th/th/.
163 Id. at. Section 2
164 Lertdhamtewe, The Journal of World Int e l l e ctual Propert y ,
121 (2014).
165 Id. at.
166 Department of Intellectual Property Regulation for Thai Geographical Indication Logo Ap-
proval B.E. 2008 (Thai.). Section 4
167 GI Thailand OFFICIAL Channel, Procedure of Control System and Process of Thai Logo’s
Permission (in Thai)(Nov. 21, 2017), available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nN-
F07KHXxE.This video file is published on YouTube in Thai. The interviewee from the DIP
Thailand shared an unpublished version with English subtitles which is on file with the
authors.
168 Department of Intellectual Property Regulation for Thai Geographical Indication Logo Ap-
proval B.E. 2008 (Thai.). Section 1
169 GI Thailand OFFICIAL Channel. Nov. 21, 2017.
170 Id. at.
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plan must comply with the product specification based on which the GI was
registered.171
The Thai control system requires producers to implement self-controls
based on the working manual and control plan.172 Furthermore, external con-
trols on producers’ compliance with the control manual and control plan have
to be implemented at least once a year.173 The costs of control have to be borne
by the producers.174 External controls can either be carried out by a Provin-
cial Committee or by a certification body.175 Provincial Committees are pub-
lic/private control bodies which are composed of individuals from the DIP, lo-
cal authorities and producers.176 The Provincial Committee can also delegate
control tasks to other public bodies, such as local committees.177 The inspectors
must be knowledgeable and experienced and be able to carry out inspections
in a fair manner.178
Certification bodies carrying out controls operate on behalf of and un-
der supervision of the DIP.179 Like in the EU, certification bodies have to be
accredited for certifying GIs by an accreditation body.180 In Thailand, the Na-
tional Bureau of Agricultural Commodity and Food Standard (ACFS), in co-
operation with the Thai Industrial Standards Institute181 (TISI) (a Department
of theThaiMinistry of Industry), accredits control bodies for agricultural com-
modities and food products under the National Standardization Act B.E. 2551
(2008)182.183 According toMarie-Vivien andVagneron, the ACFS can currently
only accredit certification bodies for GIs based on current Thai standards for
GI certification which are not internationally recognized.184 To become an in-
ternationally recognized GI accreditation body based on the ISO 17065 stan-
dard, the ACFS has to make a request at the IAF.185 For the time being, the
accreditation of certification bodies based on the ISO 17065 standard is there-






176 Marie-Vivien & Vagneron, World Food Pol i c y , 115 (2017).
177 Id. at.
178 GI Thailand OFFICIAL Channel. Nov. 21, 2017.
179 Department of Intellectual Property, Institutional Aspects of Geographical Indications Ad-
ministration in Thailand 21/10/2015. 2015.
180 GI Thailand OFFICIAL Channel. Nov. 21, 2017.
181 See https://www.tisi.go.th/home/en
182 Accessible in English via http://www.acfs.go.th/eng/standard_act.php
183 Marie-Vivien & Vagneron, World Food Pol i c y , 114 (2017).
184 Id. at.
185 Id. at.
186 Interviewwith a representative of theUNFAORegional Office for Asia and the Pacific (Oct.
18, 2018).
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Figure 4: GI control system in Thailand
Source: Adapted from187
Note: The thick blue arrows show the hierarchy between stakeholders regarding GI controls
(from top to bottom). The brown arrows which are placed within the pyramid indicate the
direction of reporting on GI controls (from bottom to top).
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The results of the external control conducted by a private certification
body (certificate of compliance) or by a Provincial Committee (control report)
are submitted to the DIP.188 The DIP is also responsible for enforcing the rules
on the use of the Thai GI logo.189 In case of non-compliance with the require-
ments, the “Department of Intellectual PropertyRegulation forThaiGeograph-
ical Indication Logo Approval B.E. 2008” stipulates that the DIP can request
the licensee to give a statement or to send documents.190 The DIP can revoke
the license to use the logo from the producer in case of misuse, who then has
to suspend the use of the logo.191 The Thai GI control system is depicted in
Figure 4.
C Comparison of the EU/German and the Thai regulation of GI controls
A comparison of EU/German and the Thai GI control systems suggests some
fundamental differences at the institutional level and regarding the purpose of
implementing GI controls. Yet, the governance and requirements for the im-
plementation of controls are rather similar in both jurisdictions (see Appendix
F for a structured comparison).
In both the EU/Germany and in Thailand the GI authority is respon-
sible for the implementation of GI controls and for the enforcement of the
relevant laws. In Thailand, the responsible body is the national competent au-
thority. In the EU, this is the competent authority designated by the EU mem-
ber states. In Germany, the responsible body is the competent authority of the
respective Länder, and hence there is an extra layer in the hierarchy of pub-
lic bodies which are part of the control system. This can be attributed to the
country’s federal structure and does not present a difference in the regulatory
approach as such.
However, an important difference at the institutional level is that in
Germany, GIs are the responsibility of the Ministry of Justice and Consumer
Protection and the Ministry of Food and Agriculture. Similarly, in most of the
German Länder, GI controls are the responsibility of the ministries for agri-
culture and/or consumer protection.192 In contrast, in Thailand, GI controls
are the responsibility of the Intellectual Property Department of the Ministry
of Commerce. The different institutional responsibilities can be explained by
the history of GI protection in both jurisdictions. In the EU, GIs are embed-
ded within the framework of the CAP and are the main pillar of the EU’s food
188 GI Thailand OFFICIAL Channel. Nov. 21, 2017.; Interview with a representative of the DIP
Thailand (Nov. 21, 2018).
189 Department of Intellectual Property Regulation for Thai Geographical Indication Logo Ap-
proval B.E. 2008 (Thai.). Section 3
190 Id. at. Section 3
191 Id. at.
192 European Union Intellectual Property Office, 73-97. December 2017.
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quality policy.193 A regulatory framework for GIs already existed before the
adoption of the WTO’s TRIPS Agreement.194 Therefore, the PDO/PGI scheme
can be said to belong to the broader body of EU food law and it is linked to
other Regulations in the field of food law (e.g. the official controls Regulation
882/2004 and the EU General Food Law (Regulation 178/2002)).195 Since in
the EU, GI protection exists only for agricultural products and foodstuffs, all
GI producers are at the same time subject to food safety requirements. The al-
location of competencies for the control of GIs with the authorities responsible
for the controlling the implementation of food (safety) law can hence facilitate
practical implementation.
In Thailand, sui generis GI protection only emerged in view of fulfill-
ing the country’s obligations under the TRIPS Agreement.196 As a result, GIs
are the responsibility of the Department of Intellectual Property, which has
no direct relation to matters of food and agriculture. Since Thailand provides
for protection of GIs beyond agricultural products and foodstuffs, GI controls
are not as obviously linked to food law in general. For the implementation of
controls on GIs for agricultural products and foodstuffs this implies that the
national authority’s competencies and experience in implementing such con-
trols might be more limited than in the EU.197
Next to this difference at the institutional level, the EU/German and
the Thai control systems differ regarding their purpose of control. In the EU,
GI controls are implemented for the purpose of controlling the use of the pro-
tected name. This is intrinsically linked to the use of the EU PDO/PGI logo
(see Figure 1), which is mandatory for any producer wishing to use the pro-
tected name.198 Besides, the implementation of controls is a prerequisite for
registering a name as PDO/PGI. As opposed to the EU, in Thailand the reg-
ulation of controls is not included in the main regulatory act on GIs but in a
separate legal act. GI controls only aim at the use of the Thai GI logo and the
use of the protected name does not have to be controlled. One interviewee
193 Becker, E s t ey Centre Journal of Int ernat ional L aw and
Trade Pol i c y , 112 (2009).
194 O’Connor , 123-162. 2004.
195 see Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 Jan-
uary 2002 Laying Down the General Principles and Requirements of Food Law, Establish-
ing the European Food Safety Authority and Laying Down Procedures in Matters of Food
Safety, 2002 O.J. (L 31/1); Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 29 April 2004 on Official Controls Performed to Ensure the Verification of
Compliance with Feed and Food Law, Animal Health and Animal Welfare Rules, 2004 O.J.
(L 165).
196 Lertdhamtewe, The Journal of World Int e l l e ctual Propert y ,
114 (2014).
197 Interviewwith a representative of theUNFAORegional Office for Asia and the Pacific (Oct.
18, 2018).
198 Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 Novem-
ber 2012 on Quality Schemes for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, 2012 O.J. (L343/1).
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explained that on the one hand “in Thailand […] it is understood, because the
model of legislation was obviously Europe, that control is an important factor
to recognize GIs”. However, on the other hand, “it was not recognized as a
primary factor for the registration of GIs […]”.199 As a result, the system of
GI control emerged separately from the GI registration system. Arguably, this
does not only present a loophole in the Thai legislation but might also present
difficulties for the protection of GIs in foreign markets such as the EU.200
Despite this, the governance structures for GI controls are similar. The
implementation of controls is supervised by the competent authorities in both
the EU/Germany and in Thailand. Likewise, the verification of compliance
with the product specification can be done either by public or by private control
bodies. Private certification bodies have to be accredited according to interna-
tional standards in the EU and in Thailand. In the EU, public control is carried
out by the competent authority and in Thailand public control is conducted by
Provincial Committees, which are supervised by the competent authority.
However, there seems to be some confusion about the role of the Provin-
cial Committees in the Thai control system. Different data sources classify
them as either an internal control body201 or as an external control body202.
One interviewee stated that passing the control by a Provincial Committee
is considered equal to having passed control by a control body.203 However,
she explained that Provincial Committee controls in Thailand are sometimes
called internal controls because the Provincial Committee and the producers
together control the compliance with the control manual and control plan at
the Provincial level.204 On the one hand, this suggests that the designation of
Provincial Committees as an internal control body can refer to the level on
which they operate, i.e. within the Thai provinces and not the national level.
On the other hand, the Provincial Committees can take the function of an in-
ternal control body in the absence of a producer group205, as producer groups
do not play a central role in the organization of GI systems in Thailand.206 Pro-
199 Interviewwith a representative of theUNFAORegional Office for Asia and the Pacific (Oct.
18, 2018).
200 Id. at.
201 Department of Intellectual Property, Institutional Aspects of Geographical Indications Ad-
ministration in Thailand 21/10/2015. 2015.
202 Marie-Vivien & Vagneron, World Food Pol i c y , 115 (2017).
203 Interview with a representative of the DIP Thailand (Nov. 21, 2018).
204 Id. at.
205 Id. at.
206 M.Canavari, et al.,Geographical Indications: Outlook on the European andThai Systems and
Overview of EU Gatekeepers Perceptions Towards GI Fruit and Coffee Products Proceeding
from Thailand, Dipartimento di Economia e Ingegneria agrarie, Alma Mater Studiorum-
University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy - Bioagrico-op scrl, Casalecchio di Reno (BO), Italy -
Thai-Italian Chamber of Commerce(2010), available at https://www.feedingknowledge.n
et/home?p_p_id=1_WAR_feeding_knowledgeportlet&p_p_lifecycle=2&p_p_state=pop
_up&p_p_mode=view&p_p_cacheability=cacheLevelPage&_1_WAR_feeding_knowled
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ducers are involved in the Provincial Committees.207 They are hence not fully
independent and therefore appear to be an internal rather than external control
entity. Notably, if Provincial Committees are considered an internal control
body, no external control would be mandatory for the use of the Thai GI logo.
All in all, it seems questionable whether the Thai Provincial Committees are
comparable to what is considered a competent authority in the EU.
The comparison of the two regulatory approaches reveals that GI con-
trols on themarket are the responsibility of the competent authority in both the
EU/Germany and in Thailand. However, the results of the interviews indicate
that in Thailand the market controls are not systematically implemented.208
In contrast, the systematic implementation of GI controls to verify producers’
compliance with the GI product specification is a condition forThai GIs which
are registered as PDO/PGI in the EU due to the provisions of EU law. Follow-
ing, we analyze and compare the practical implementation of GI controls in
the EU/Germany and in Thailand.
VI Pract i ca l impl ementat ion of G I control s i n
the EU /Germany and in Tha i l and
We next analyze the practical implementation of GI controls for the three case
studies Hessischer Handkäse (Germany), TKR and Kafae Doi Chaang (both
registered as GI in Thailand and as PGI in the EU). For each product, we pro-
vide some information about the product and its supply chain first. Following,
we examine the governance of controls and the specific control measures im-
plemented. In the analysis we distinguish between self-controls (carried out by
individual producers), internal controls (carried out by GI producer groups)
and external controls (carried out by an independent control body).209 Finally,
we compare the practical implementation of controls for the three case studies.
geportlet_cmd=serveAttachment&_1_WAR_feeding_knowledgeportlet_stepAttachmen
tId=22643.
207 Marie-Vivien & Vagneron, World Food Pol i c y , 115 (2017).
208 Interviewwith a representative of theUNFAORegional Office for Asia and the Pacific (Oct.
18, 2018); Interview with a Strength2Food project researcher (Nov. 5, 2018).
209 E. Vandecandelaere, et al., Linking People, Places and Products. A Guide for Promoting Qual-
ity Linked to Geographical Origin and Sustainable Geographical Indications, 2nd, FAO and
SINER-GI(2009-2010), available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/013/i1760e/i1760e00.pdf.
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A Hessischer Handkäse
1 Characteristics and supply chain
Hessischer Handkäse describes small cheeses which were originally formed by
hand and so became palm-sized.210 Theproduction of Hessischer Handkäse in
Hesse has been first documented in 1813.211 It has since developed as a specialty
and cultural asset in the region.212 Hessischer Handkäse is a sour milk cheese
which is primarily made from sour milk quark, exclusively made of cow’s milk,
produced only by acidification (without rennet).213 It can take the form of a
smeared acid curd cheese (yellow cheese) or a smeared acid curd cheese (yel-
low cheese) with lactic mold formation (home-made).214 Each cheese weighs
between 20 g and 125 g.215 Further ingredients are ripening salt, table salt (possi-
bly iodinated), caraway, depending on the recipe, possibly casein and the pure
cultures (red smear cultures).216 Theproduction of the cheese has to take place
within the Federal State of Hesse (see Figure 5).217 This comprises the blending
and grinding of the individual batches of sour milk quark, the mixing with the
other ingredients, the forming of the cheese blocks, ripening and packaging.218
Hessischer Handkäse was registered as a PGI in the EU in 2010.219
The supply chain of Hessischer Handkäse comprises the producers of
the milk and the sour milk quark, the cheese dairies and several distribution
channels. The supply chain is depicted in Figure 6. Only the processing of the
cheese by the cheese dairies has to take place within the specified geographi-
cal area (P1 in Figure 6). Currently, only a single producer in Hesse produces
sour milk quark and hence the cheese dairies source most of the sour milk
quark from outside of Hesse.220 In total, four cheese dairies which produce
Hessischer Handkäse are PGI certified.221 They supply their produce to vari-
ous distribution channels such as supermarkets, farmer’s markets and gastron-
210 Publication of an Application Pursuant to Article 6(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No
510/2006 on the Protection of Geographical Indications and Designations of Origin for
Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, 2009 O.J. (C 320/47) 47.
211 Id. at, 49.
212 Id. at, 49-50.
213 Id. at, 47-48.
214 Id. at., 47.
215 Id. at., 47.
216 Id. at.
217 Id. at, 49.
218 Id. at.
219 Commission Regulation (EU) No 784/2010 of 3 September 2010 Entering a Name in the
Register of Protected Designations of Origin and Protected Geographical Indications (Hes-
sischer Handkäse or Hessischer Handkäs (PGI)), 2010 O.J. (L 234/5).
220 Interview with a processor of Hessischer Handkäse (Oct. 19, 2018).
221 Landesvereinigung Milch Hessen, Molkereien & Käsereien in Hessen(n.d.), available at
https://www.milchhessen.de/mediaarchiv/grab_pic.php?id=25600.
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Figure 5: Production area of Hessischer Handkäse
Source: https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hessen
omy, mainly within the boundaries of Hesse where the cheese is mostly con-
sumed.222
2 Governance of controls and control measures
Processors of Hessischer Handkäse implement self-controls and are subject to
external controls. The self-controls focus on traceability, the quality of the raw
material and the quality of the final product. Therefore, the processors meticu-
lously write traceability records and production plans. Moreover, they control
the microbiological and chemical properties of the cheese several times a year
either in their own laboratories or through external laboratories, depending
on the size and the capacity of the business.223 One processor pointed out that
these self-control measures are not implemented to ensure compliance with
the GI product specification, but that they are carried out anyway to meet the
requirements of food law.224 The implementation of self-controls is neverthe-
less a requirement for processors to pass the external GI control.225
222 Interview with a processor of Hessischer Handkäse (Oct. 19, 2018).
223 Id. at.
224 Interview with a processor of Hessischer Handkäse (Oct. 19, 2018).
225 Regierungspräsidium Giessen, Allgemeine Betriebsprüfung (2017) (on file with authors).
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Figure 6: Supply chain of PGI certified Hessischer Handkäse
Source: Depiction by the authors.
External controls are carried out by the regional councilGiessen (Regierungsprä-
sidium Giessen, hereinafter referred to as RP Giessen), which is the competent
authority responsible for implementing official controls on producers and in
the market in Hesse.226 The RP Giessen is accountable to the Hessian Ministry
for the Environment, Climate Protection, Agriculture and Consumer Protec-
tion (Hessisches Ministerium für Umwelt, Klimaschutz, Landwirtschaft und
Verbraucherschutz, hereinafter referred to as HMUKLV), the highest author-
ity of the Land Hesse for GIs.227 The HMUKLV in turn is responsible to report
to the Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture (BMEL), which then reports
to the EU.228 Two inspectors from the RP Giessen carry out all control tasks.
Mutual assistance can be provided by other authorities, such as those dealing
with food safety matters.229 The auditors of the RP Giessen are subject to in-
ternal supervision and are furthermore supervised by the HMUKLV and by
the Hessian audit office.230 Moreover, the implementation of the PGI/PDO
controls is audited by the EU.231
226 European Union Intellectual Property Office, 84. December 2017.
227 Id. at.
228 Interview with two auditors of the RP Giessen (Oct. 24, 2018).
229 Id. at.
230 Id. at.
231 Id. at.; Article 45 (1) of Regulation 882/2004 requires that the implementation of official con-
trols in the member states shall be controlled by experts from the European Commission
on a regular basis.
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The official controls on the processors of Hessischer Handkäse take
place annually and are announced.232 Every processor is controlled once a
year at their production premises.233 The auditors carry out the controls based
on a checklist they created based on the requirements of the product specifi-
cation.234 The checklist for Hessischer Handkäse checks processors’ compli-
ance with the product specification, traceability, storage, labelling and qual-
ity assurance.235 The auditor visually inspects the condition of the production
premises, taking into account aspects such as hygiene, machinery/equipment
and the processor’s production capability. Moreover, the appearance, consis-
tency, taste, odor and packaging of the cheese according to the specification as
well as the correct labelling are inspected. To control traceability, records such
as delivery notes, production plans, sales notes, and the documentation of the
produced quantities are inspected. As noted above, another requirement of the
external control is that the processor has carried out self-controls. Processors
also have to have passed an external food safety inspection (quality assurance
system such as HACCP or IFS236) to be able to pass the GI control. Finally, if
needed, auditors are able to take samples of the product and have them ana-
lyzed by a laboratory designated by the RP Giessen237.238
If the control reveals processors’ infringement of any of the require-
ments listed in the checklist, these will be indicated thereon and have to be
eliminated by the processor by a certain date set by the auditor.239 The action
required and the time span given to ameliorate non-compliance depends on
the severity of the violation (minor infringement or major infringement).240
In accordance with Regulation 1151/2012, the costs of the official control have
to be borne by the processors.241 These amount to up to 250 euros per control
and are calculated based on time.242 The auditors of the RP Giessen summa-
rize the results of the controls in a control report, which is passed on to the
HMUKLV upon request.243
232 Interview with a processor of Hessischer Handkäse (Oct. 19, 2018).
233 Interview with two auditors of the RP Giessen (Oct. 24, 2018).
234 Id at.
235 Regierungspräsidium Giessen, Allgemeine Betriebsprüfung (2017) (on file with authors).
236 HACCP stands for “Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points“. IFS stands for “Interna-
tional Food Standard”.
237 According to Article 12 (1) of Regulation 882/2004, the competent authority shall designate
laboratories that carry out the analysis of samples taken during official controls.
238 Regierungspräsidium Giessen, Allgemeine Betriebsprüfung (2017) (on file with authors);
Interview with two auditors of the RP Giessen (Oct. 24, 2018).
239 Regierungspräsidium Giessen, Allgemeine Betriebsprüfung (2017) (on file with authors).
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Figure 7: Governance of PGI controls for Hessischer Handkäse
Source: Depiction by the authors. Note: The thick blue arrows show the hierarchy between
stakeholders regarding GI controls (from top to bottom). The brown arrows indicate the
direction of reporting on GI controls (from bottom to top).
B Kao Hom Mali Thung Kula Rong-Hai
1 Characteristics and supply chain
The name Kao Hom Mali Thung Kula Rong-Hai (TKR) derives from the Thai
term for Jasmine rice, Kao Hom Mali, and a story about the journey of the eth-
nic group of the Kula.244 Under the Thai Agricultural Standard for Thai Hom
Mali rice, two rice varieties can be considered Hom Mali rice: Khao Dawk
Mali 105 (KDML 105) and RD 15.245 RD 15 is a mutant of KDML 105.246 After a
seed exchange program in 1979 encouraged farmers to replace their seeds with
good quality seeds such as KDML 105, KDML 105 became widespread in the
Northeast of Thailand.247 TKR was registered as a GI in Thailand in 2006 and
as PGI in the EU in 2013.248
244 Napasintuwong, 88. 2019.
245 National Bureau of Agricultural Commodity and Food Standards, Thai Agri-
cultural Standard TAS 4000-2003. Thai Hom Mali Rice(2003), available at
http://www.acfs.go.th/standard/download/eng/Thai_Hom_Mali.pdf.
246 Napasintuwong, 87. 2019.
247 Id. at. 88
248 Announcement for the Amendment of the Geographical Indication Registration Thung Kula
Rong Hai Jasmine Rice, 2012 (in Thai), available at http://www.ipthailand.go.th; Commis-
sion Implementing Regulation (EU) No 120/2013 of 11 February 2013 entering a name in the
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Figure 8: Production area of TKR
Source255. The thick lines indicate the boundaries of the five provinces. The shaded areas
indicate the Thung Kula Rong-Hai area.
The area where TKR is grown extends over five provinces in the North-
east ofThailand (theRoi Et, Surin, Sisaket,Maharasakham, andYasothonprovinces;
see Figure 8).249 The know-how of the local people in rice cultivation and the
geomorphological conditions of the area (i.e. nature of the soil, water qual-
ity, hours of sunshine, narrow temperature range, cool dry weather in the har-
vesting season) determine the qualities of the rice.250 TKR is a light-sensitive
paddy rice, which can be brown or white (milled rice).251 The rice seeds must
be of Khao Dawk Mali 105 and Kor Khor or RD 15 breeds, which must be ob-
tained from the Thai Rice Department (RD) or from certified rice-grain pro-
ducers.252 TKR is grown in the rainy season and harvested after the rainy sea-
son has ended.253 The production cycle of TKR (sowing, cultivation, harvest-
ing, milling, packaging and labelling) has to take place within the specified
area.254
register of protected designations of origin and protected geographical indications (Khao
Hom Mali Thung Kula Rong-Hai) (PGI)), 2013 O.J. (L 41/3).
249 Publication of an Application Pursuant to Article 6(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No
510/2006 on the Protection of Geographical Indications and Designations of Origin for
Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, 2010 O.J. (C 169/7).
250 Id. at, 10-11.
251 Id. at, 7.
252 Id. at, 8.
253 Id. at, 10.
254 Id. at, 9.
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Most of the farmers in the Thung Kula Rong-Hai area produce Hom
Mali rice, but only a few of them are GI certified and produce TKR.256 In
2008, only around 1.3 percent (1131 households) of the total number of house-
holds producing Hom Mali rice was GI certified.257 According to Orachos
Napasintuwong258, the Thai Geographical Indication Rice Standard259 stipu-
lates that GI certified rice farmers also have to meet either the Thai organic
standard or Thai Good Agricultural Practice Standards (ThaiGAP)260. Most
farmers who produce TKR are members of a farmers group or an agricultural
cooperative where they sell their paddy to.261 Three out of forty-six agricul-
tural cooperatives in the area are GI certified TKR collectors and one of them
is also a GI certified TKR processor.262 Three of the nine farmers’ organiza-
tions are also millers (processors) and wholesalers/retailers.263 Next to the
farmers’ organizations engaging in processing/milling, there are five other pro-
cessors/millers that are also wholesalers/retailers.264 One of them is an agricul-
tural cooperative.265 Moreover, two agricultural cooperatives act as middle-
men that transfer paddy from certified GI farmers to certified GI millers. 266
The millers/processors sell the rice to wholesalers/retailers or directly to the
domestic and international markets.267 TKR is mainly determined for export
markets, the main export destination being the EU.268 Figure 9 summarizes
the GI certified TKR value chain.
256 Napasintuwong, 92. 2019.
257 C.Ngokkuen&U.Grote,Geographical Indication for JasmineRice: Applying a LogitModel to
Predict Adoption Behavior of Thai Farm Households, 51 Quarterly Journal of
Int ernat ional Agr i cu lture 157, 158 (2012).
258 Napasintuwong, The Roles of Agricultural Cooperatives in Certification and Production of
Geographical Indication (GI) Rice in Thailand 4. 2017.
259 Thai Standard for Geographical Indication Rice TAS 4005-2014 (28 Nov 2014), see
http://www.acfs. go.th/eng/commodity_standard.php?pageid=6 (no English translation
available).
260 National Bureau of Agricultural Commodity and Food Stan-
dard, Unofficial Translation Thai Agricultural Standard TAS 4406-
2014. Good Agricultural Practices for Rice Seed (2014), available at
http://www.acfs.go.th/standard/download/eng/GAP%20FOR%20RICE%20SEED.pdf.
261 Napasintuwong, 95. 2019.
262 Napasintuwong, The Roles of Agricultural Cooperatives in Certification and Production of
Geographical Indication (GI) Rice in Thailand 5. 2017.





268 Ngokkuen & Grote, Quarterly Journal of Int ernat ional Agr i -
cu lture , 158 (2012).
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Figure 9: Supply chain of GI/PGI certified TKR
Source: Orachos Napasintuwong269.
2 Governance of controls and control measures
ForTKR, self-controls, internal controls and external controls are implemented.
Self-controls are carried out by farmers, processors (collectors/millers) and
wholesalers/retailers/exporters based on the requirements set out in the GI
working manual.270 The method of control for farmers is mainly the writing
of records (e.g. purchase of rice seeds, farm management, planting, harvest-
ing, output quantities, storage and transportation).271 The processors (collec-
tors/millers) test and record the quality of the rice (i.e. moisture content, adul-
teration of weed rice, percentage of head rice) received from the farmers ac-
cording to the working manual upon every purchased batch.272 Furthermore,
they implement traceability measures (e.g. recording receipts, delivery pa-
pers). 273 The wholesalers/retailers/exporters randomly inspect the quality of
the milled white or brown rice based on the working manual, the ACFS Good
Agricultural Practice for Rice Seed standard274 and other relevant baseline doc-
270 Id. at. 98-100.
271 O. Napasintuwong, Khao Hom Mali Thung Kula Rong-Hai (Work in progress for the EU’s
Strength2Food Project). Unpublished manuscript ( on file with authors). 2018.
272 Id. at.
273 Id. at.
274 The TKR product specification (section 5.3.) relates the quality of TKR to compliance with
good agricultural practices, but does not specifically require compliance. However, the
geographical indication rice standards of the National Bureau of Agricultural Commodity
and Food Standard require that GI rice productsmust either be certified organic or certified
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uments.275 They furthermore record and check the quantities purchased and
sold.276 The implementation of self-controls is a prerequisite for internal con-
trols.277
The internal control is carried out by the farmers’ organizations based
on the GI working manual and other relevant references such as the Good
Agricultural Practice for Rice Seed standard278.279 It covers all stages of the
value chain (growing, collecting, processing, wholesaling).280 The controls fo-
cus on stakeholders’ compliance with the working manual (e.g. inspection of
planting area, storage location, quality of paddy, packaging, labelling) as well
as traceability (e.g. inspection of procurement activities and transportation
records, inspection of output quantity).281 The frequency of the controls de-
pends on the target of the control and ranges from once a year to several times
per year.282
The external control for TKR is carried out by the Italian ISO 17065-
accredited certification body Bioagricert.283 Bioagricert is accredited by the
Italian accreditation bodyACCREDIA.284 NoProvincial Committee is involved
in the control of TKR, as the production area of TKR spreads over five differ-
ent Thai provinces.285 Control by a certification body is a requirement for the
registration of TKR as PGI in the EU.286 External controls are carried out once
per year on the farmers’ organizations and on 10 percent of farmers, collec-
tors/processors and exporters/sellers.287 The focus of the controls is on com-
pliance with the parameters set out in the working manual (e.g. planting area,
type of seed, land/soil, quality of the paddy, collecting, processing, packaging,
labelling, storage and transportation) and traceability (e.g. records and docu-
ments).288 The method of inspection is both a visual inspection of the produc-
with the ThaiGAP id. at; National Bureau of Agricultural Commodity and Food Standard.
2014..
275 Napasintuwong, Khao Hom Mali Thung Kula Rong-Hai. 2018.
276 Id. at.
277 Id. at.
278 National Bureau of Agricultural Commodity and Food Standard. 2014.




283 European Commission, Agriculture and Rural Development, DOOR.
284 Bioagricert, Certification. Geographical Indications(2015), available at
https://www.bioagricert.org/en/certification/product-quality/geographical-
indications.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2019).
285 Interview with a representative of the DIP Thailand, (Nov. 21, 2018).
286 Napasintuwong, 99. 2019; Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 21 November 2012 on Quality Schemes for Agricultural Products and
Foodstuffs, 2012 O.J. (L343/1). Art. 37 (2) (a) (b)
287 Napasintuwong, Khao Hom Mali Thung Kula Rong-Hai. 2018.
288 Id. at.; Interview with a representative of the DIP Thailand (Nov. 21, 2018)
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Figure 10: Governance of GI/PGI controls for TKR
Source: Depiction by the authors. Note: The thick blue arrows show the hierarchy between
stakeholders regarding GI controls (from top to bottom). The brown arrow indicates the
direction of reporting on GI controls (from bottom to top).
tion site/fields and an inspection of documents.289 According to information
by Orachos Napasintuwong290 and two Thai interviewees291, the costs of certi-
fication by a certification body can amount to 1000292-8000 euros per year. In
the past few years, the DIP or the RD almost entirely subsidized the costs of
private certification.293 The results of the external inspection are reported to
the DIP.294
289 Interview with a representative of the DIP Thailand (Nov. 21, 2018).
290 Napasintuwong, 92. 2019.
291 Interview with a Strength2Food project researcher (Nov. 5, 2018); Interview with a repre-
sentative of the DIP Thailand (Nov. 21, 2018).
292 Napasintuwong 2019 notes that these were the annual certification fees for a processor in
2017, excluding the fees for certification of products and the use of the certification body’s
certification seal. These extra costs, according to the author, ranged between 0.3-1 percent,
depending on the turnover of the certified exported products.
293 Napasintuwong, 94. 2019.
294 GI Thailand OFFICIAL Channel. Nov. 21, 2017.
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C Kafae Doi Chaang
1 Characteristics and supply chain
The production area of Kafae Doi Chaang was initially used for illegal opium
cultivation.295 The Thai / UN Crop Replacement and Community Develop-
ment Project encouraged the cultivation of substitutive crops such as arabica
coffee to improve the livelihood of the local communities.296 In 2003, the Doi
Chaang Coffee Original Co. was founded.297 In 2006, the company estab-
lished a strategic partnership with Canadian businessmen in view of exploiting
the potential to sell Kafae Doi Chaang on international markets.298 Kafae Doi
Chaang is mainly determined for export markets299, such as the US, Canada,
the United Kingdom, South Korea and most of the ASEAN countries.300
Kafae Doi Chaang refers to the Arabica varieties Caturra, Catimor and
Catuai.301 The coffee trees are located within the area of the Doi Chaang and
Ban Mai Pattana villages, in the Tambon Wawee, Mae Suai district of the Chi-
angrai province (see Figure 11). 302 The coffee is grown on the slopes of the
Doi Chaang mountain at an altitude of 1100-1700 meters above sea level.303
The total production area is about 3040 ha.304 The coffee variety refers to both
green beans and roasted coffee, which both have to meet specific quality re-
quirements.305 The raw material (seeds) must come from reliable sources such
as the Chiangrai University, the Department of Agriculture, or can be selected
from healthy coffee plants.306 Kafae Doi Chaang is cultivated either using con-
ventional or organic methods.307
295 P. Angkasith, Coffee Production Status and Potential of Organic Arabica Coffee in Thailand,
Paper presented at the First Asian Regional Round-table on Sustainable, Organic and Spe-
ciality Coffee Production, Processing and Marketing 26-28 Feb. 2001, Chiang Mai, Thai-
land(2001), available at http://www.journal.au.edu/au_techno/2002/jan2002/article3.pdf.
296 Id. at.
297 Doi Chaang Coffee, Legend of Doi Chaang Coffee(2019), available at
https://doichaangcoffee.co.th/en/about-us/the-legend/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2019).
298 Id. at.
299 U. Noppakoonwong, et al., Research and Development of Arabica Coffee in Thailand. Con-
ference Paper (April 2015) at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/280740360_Resea
rch_and_Development_of_Arabica_Coffee_in_Thailand.
300 Lilavanichakul, 287. 2019.
301 Publication of an Application Pursuant to Article 50(2)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012
of the European Parliament and of the Council on Quality Schemes for Agricultural Prod-
ucts and Foodstuffs, 2014 O.J. (C 49/8) 8.
302 Id. at.
303 Id. at.
304 Lilavanichakul, 291. 2019.
305 Publication of an Application Pursuant to Article 50(2)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012
of the European Parliament and of the Council on Quality Schemes for Agricultural Prod-
ucts and Foodstuffs, 2014 O.J. (C 49/8) 11.
306 Id. at. 9.
307 Id. at. 11.
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Figure 11: Production area of Kafae Doi Chaang
Source: Depiction by the authors.308
The coffee beans have a red to yellow color, depending on the variety.309
The coffee cherries blossom in February and the harvest takes place between
November and March. 310 The specific quality of Kafae Doi Chaang derives
from geographical and geoclimatic factors (e.g. steep slope gradients, sandy
loom soil, natural shade, high altitude) and human know-how (e.g. cultiva-
tion, harvesting and processingmethods).311 Theharvesting of the coffee beans
as well as the processing (wet-method processing, extraction, drying, hulling
and sorting) have to take place within the specified geographical area.312 The
roasting of the coffee beans does not necessarily take place within this area.313
Kafae Doi Chaang was registered as a GI in Thailand in 2007314 and as a PGI
in the EU in 2015.315
309 Publication of an Application Pursuant to Article 50(2)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012
of the European Parliament and of the Council on Quality Schemes for Agricultural Prod-
ucts and Foodstuffs, 2014 O.J. (C 49/8) 9.
310 Id. at.
311 Id. at. 10-11.
312 Id. at. 9.
313 Id. at. 10.
314 Canavari, et al., 51. 2010.
315 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1135 of 9 July 2015 Entering a Name in
the Register of Protected Designations of Origin and Protected Geographical Indications
((Kafae Doi Chaang) (PGI)), 2015 O.J. (L 185/5).
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Figure 12: Supply chain of GI/PGI certified Kafae Doi Chaang
Source: Apichaya Lilavanichakul320.
The supply chain of Kafae Doi Chaang is depicted in Figure 12. It com-
prises coffee growers, manufacturers and various distribution channels. There
were 570 coffee growers registered at the Doi Chang coffee company (man-
ufacturer/processor) in 2016, coming from five different villages in the Doi
Chaang area.316 They directly deliver the coffee beans to the manufacturer for
processing and roasting, which is done at the Doi Chaang plant.317 The man-
ufacturer delivers the green and roasted beans to a distributor, who is located
in Bangkok and distributes the coffee beans to the domestic and international
markets. 318 The Doi Chaang coffee company moreover distributes the cof-
fee beans directly to franchisees, individual cafés/restaurants/hotels, retailers,
exporters and through e-commerce.319
2 Governance of controls and control measures
The control system for Kafae Doi Chaang comprises self-control, internal con-
trol by a Provincial Committee and external control by a private certification
body. The self-control is applied at the coffee growers’ and the manufacturer’s
level.321 As is the case for TKR, self-control implies that the farmers and pro-
cessors control whether the coffee beans meet the requirements set out in the
working manual.322 The processor further controls the quality of the coffee
316 Lilavanichakul, 291, 293. 2019.
317 Id. at. 293.
318 Id. at..
319 Id. at. 293-294.
321 Id. at. 296.
322 Id. at. 297.
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beans upon receipt by the coffee growers.323 One interviewee suggested that in
the case of Kafae Doi Chaang, the system of self-controls is also one where
“friends monitor friends”.324 Accordingly, the coffee grower community se-
lects a head of the group who is responsible to take care of the self-controls
within the group.325 This, next to checking compliance with the working man-
ual, means that:
“[f]or example, they will help the growers in terms of, okay, if you do
not have the seeds, I will provide you the seeds, or if you need fertilizer, we can
share fertilizer or we can share some external labor […] they help each other.
And they make sure that the quality of the – they check the method how to
grow the coffee. So, pretty much, in general, the product will come with the
same quality.”326
Unlike in the TKR case, there are no farmers’ organizationswhich carry
out internal controls. Instead, the Provincial Committee carries out internal
controls on the coffee growers and on the manufacturer based on the working
manual and the control plan.327 Provincial Committee controls are carried out
using quality inspection forms created by the producers when setting up the
control manual.328
The task of the Provincial Committee is to check the running of the
self-controls of the coffee growers (regarding seeding, planting, farm manage-
ment and harvesting) and of the manufacturers (regarding collecting, quality
control and processing).329 The Provincial Committee also controls the prod-
uct’s traceability.330 In case the control establishes non-compliance on behalf
of the producers, the Provincial Committee issues a warning.331 The frequency
of inspections by the Provincial Committee is at least every two years and their
results are reported to the DIP.332 According to one interviewee, the controls by
a Provincial Committee “will cost only the gas”, and hence only the expenses
incurred due to travelling to the producers’ premises.333
Like TKR, Kafae Doi Chaang is subject to external control by the ISO
17065-accredited certification body Bioagricert.334 The control is carried out




327 Lilavanichakul, 296-297. 2019.; Interviewwith a representative from the DIPThailand (Nov.
21, 2018); Interview with a Strength2Food project researcher (Nov. 5, 2018).
328 GI Thailand OFFICIAL Channel. Nov. 21, 2017.
329 Lilavanichakul, 297. 2019.




334 E-Mail from Strength2Food project researcher to Verena Preusse (Nov. 17, 2018, 2:04 pm
UTC) (on file with the authors).
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Figure 13: Governance of GI/PGI controls for Kafae Doi Chaang
Source: Depiction by the authors. Note: The thick blue arrows show the hierarchy between
stakeholders regarding GI controls (from top to bottom). The brown arrows which are placed
within the pyramid indicate the direction of reporting on GI controls (from bottom to top).
once a year on a random selection of coffee growers and on themanufacturer.335
The certification body checks the producers’/manufacturers’ compliance with
the working manual, the running of the self-controls and that of the controls
carried out by the Provincial Committee.336 Controls are done using check-
lists.337 The auditors do field inspections, check the physical and chemical
properties of the coffee beans and the packaging and labelling based on the
requirements of the specification.338 Although the results do not specifically
indicate that traceability is controlled, it seems likely that it nevertheless is a
part of the external control as it is conducted by the same certification body
that controls TKR. As noted before, the costs of private certification can range
from 1000-8000339 euros.340 When producers have passed the external control,
the certification body hands in a certificate of compliance to the DIP.341
335 Interview with a Strength2Food project researcher (Nov. 5, 2018).
336 Lilavanichakul, 297. 2019.
337 Interview with a Strength2Food project researcher (Nov. 5, 2018).
338 Id. at.; Interview with a representative from the DIP Thailand (Nov. 21, 2018).
339 Napasintuwong, 92. 2019.; Interview with a Strength2Food project researcher (Nov. 5,
2018); Interview with a representative from the DIP Thailand (Nov. 21, 2018).
340 According to Canavari et al. 2010, the costs of private certification are covered by private
resources/funds.
341 GI Thailand OFFICIAL Channel. Nov. 21, 2017.
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D Comparison of the governance and control measures of GI controls in the
EU/Germany and in Thailand
A comparison of the three case studies demonstrates that for each product, GI
controls follow a uniquemode of governance (see Appendix G for a structured
comparison). At the same time, the results suggest that the control measures
which are implemented are similar for all three cases.
In the case ofHessischerHandkäse, the interviewees suggested that self-
controls are not specifically carried out to establish compliance with the GI
product specification, but more generally to fulfil the requirements of food law.
According to the EU’s General Food Law342, the responsibility to ensure food
safety lies with the food producers, processors and distributors343 who also
have to establish product traceability344 and undergo external inspections.345
The results of the controls implemented in the context of food safety are then
taken into account by the external GI control. One producer summarized:
“They […] take it as a basis and say: You have got this control mechanism any-
way. So that’s fine“346.347 This shows that for Hessischer Handkäse, GI controls
are closely linked to the requirements of EU food law. This may be facilitated
by the small number of ingredients and the relatively simple production pro-
cess of Hessischer Handkäse which possibly renders the implementation of
comprehensive self-controls based on the product specification unnecessary.
In contrast, producers of TKR and Kafae Doi Chaang carry out self-
controls based on the GI workingmanual and control plan. Consequently, self-
controls are targeted at the specific requirements for GIs. The results indicate
that, unlike in the EU/Germany, compliancewith food law is not a requirement
for passing GI controls in Thailand. One interviewee stated:
“I do not think there are any relations between GI and food safety. I
think GI is related to the quality of the product, like the uniqueness of the
product. But even that it is GI, it can make you sick“.348
This suggests that in Thailand no direct link is made between GIs and
food safety regulations. One reason for this probably lies in the attribution of
responsibilities for GI control and food safety issues to separate ministries and
342 Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January
2002 Laying Down the General Principles and Requirements of Food Law, Establishing the
European Food Safety Authority and Laying Down Procedures in Matters of Food Safety,
2002 O.J. (L 31/1).
343 Id. at. Art. 17 (1)
344 Id. at. Art. 18
345 Id. at. Art. 17 (2)
346 Translation by the author. The original quote in German reads as follows: “Die stützen sich
[…] darauf und sagen: Ihr habt eh diesen Kontrollmechanismus. Und von daher gesehen
ist das in Ordnung.“
347 Interview with a processor of Hessischer Handkäse, (Oct. 19, 2018).
348 Interview with a Strength2Food project researcher (Nov. 17, 2018).
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a lack of inter-ministerial cooperation.349 Nevertheless, Canavari et al. found
that food safety is an important factor influencing European gatekeepers’ de-
cision whether or not to purchase GI food products from Thailand.350 This
suggests that Thai producers seeking to export their products to the EU might
have to implement stricter food safety measures than producers selling on the
localmarket. Besides, TKR andKafaeDoi Chaang are both certifiedwith other
standards (i.e. ThaiGAP, (EU and US) organic standards) for which producers
might implement food safetymeasures beyondwhat is required for GIs.351 One
interviewee indicated that when Thai GI products are certified with ThaiGAP
the external GI control inspects the records which producers are required to
write therefore, which suggests similarities to the findings forHessischerHand-
käse.352
In the case of Kafae Doi Chaang self-controls also imply a community
aspect, as the coffee growers mutually assist each other in establishing compli-
ance with the GI product specification. This was not reported for the case of
TKR, although the results are not conclusive in this regard. No such mutual
assistance exists between producers of Hessischer Handkäse.353 This difference
might be attributable to various factors such as the general level of development
of the case study region, farm/firm size, specifics of the products’ production
process, habits within the community of producers or cultural aspects.
In view of internal controls, the comparison demonstrates that pro-
ducer groups are involved in theGI controls only in the case of TKR.The entire
TKR value chain is controlled by the TKR producer groups based on the GI
working manual. Next to contributing to aspects of quality control, Orachos
Napasintuwong found that for TKR agricultural cooperatives generally play an
important role in connecting small-scale farmers to high quality product mar-
kets354, although the presence of producer groups is generally not common in
Thailand.355 In the case of Kafae Doi Chaang andHessischer Handkäse there is
no producer group which carries out internal controls. In the German context,
it was however noted that this is different for other German PGI/PDO prod-
ucts where producer groups take an active role in the controls.356 The absence
of internal controls in the Hessian case furthermore reflects their voluntary na-
349 Interviewwith a representative of theUNFAORegional Office for Asia and the Pacific (Oct.
18, 2018).
350 Canavari, et al., 80. 2010.
351 Napasintuwong, The Roles of Agricultural Cooperatives in Certification and Production of
Geographical Indication (GI) Rice in Thailand 6. 2017; Doi Chaang Coffee, Global Recog-
nitions(2019), available at https://doichaangcoffee.co.th/en/about-us/certification/ (last vis-
ited Jan. 19, 2019).
352 Interview with a representative of the DIP Thailand (Nov. 21, 2018).
353 Interview with a processor of Hessischer Handkäse (Oct. 19, 2018).
354 Napasintuwong, The Roles of Agricultural Cooperatives in Certification and Production of
Geographical Indication (GI) Rice in Thailand 1-11. 2017.
355 Interview with a representative of the DIP Thailand (Nov. 21, 2018).
356 Interview with two auditors of the RP Giessen (Oct. 24, 2018).
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ture as stipulated in Regulation 1151/2012. Interestingly, due to the absence of
a producer group in the case of Kafae Doi Chaang internal controls are carried
out by the public/private Provincial Committee.
Finally, the producers of all three products investigated are subject to
external control. While for Hessischer Handkäse a system of public external
control is implemented, external control for TKR and Kafae Doi Chaang is car-
ried out by a private ISO 17065-accredited certification body. Despite this pub-
lic/private dichotomy, the control measures implemented appear to be similar
for all cases, focusing on compliance with the product specification, traceabil-
ity and quality assurance. The results indicate that in none of the two Thai
cases the Provincial Committee takes on the role of an external control body.
The implementation of public external controls instead of private controls in
the Hessian case may be due to the limited number of Hessian PDOs/PGIs
which renders the delegation of control tasks to certification bodies unneces-
sary in terms of the workload faced by the inspectors.357 Besides, there are no
approved certification bodies in Hesse as opposed to other German Länder.358
The finding for Hesse is nevertheless interesting as it does not mirror the shift
from public to private governance of GI controls which Marie-Vivien et al. de-
scribed for France.359
VI I The i n f luence of EU GI regul at i on s on the
regul at i on and pract i ca l impl ementat ion of G I
control s i n Tha i l and
Based on the research findings for research questions one and two and in view
of the assumptions of the theory of extra-territorialization of EU law, we next
discuss to what extent EU GI regulations shape the regulation of GI controls
in Thailand and their practical implementation for the two Thai case studies.
The analysis of the GI controls implemented for TKR and Kafae Doi
Chaang tentatively suggest the presence of a de facto extra-territorialization ef-
fect. The analysis of TKR has shown that no Provincial Committee is available
that could carry out the external control and private certification is required
here to use the Thai GI logo.360 Hence, the results are inconclusive in the case
of TKR. However, the Kafae Doi Chaang case study has shown that controls
are carried out by a Provincial Committee and by an ISO 17065- accredited
certification body, although controls by a Provincial Committee would suffice
to be able to use the Thai GI logo. It hence seems that the standards of con-
trol for this GI product are higher than what is required according to Thai
laws. In fact, one interviewee noted that the Doi Chaang coffee company is
the only company in the area of production which is able to pass the control
357 Interview with two auditors of the RP Giessen (Oct. 24, 2018).
358 European Union Intellectual Property Office, 84. December 2017.
359 Marie-Vivien, et al., World Deve lopment , 25-34 (2017).
360 Interview with a representative of the DIP Thailand (Nov. 21, 2018).
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by an ISO 17065-accredited certification body and, therefore, only coffee pro-
duced by this company can carry the EU PGI logo.361 In principle, Regulation
1151/2012 allows for two control options, i.e. private certification or control by a
designated competent authority. The fact that in the case of Kafae Doi Chaang
private certification is adopted in addition to control by a Provincial Commit-
tee possibly means that the Thai Provincial Committees do not fulfil the EU’s
requirements for public control.
Information obtained through the expert interviews beyond the level of
the case studies suggests that the control system implemented for Thai prod-
ucts which are registered as PGI/PDO in the EU generally differs from that
implemented on Thai GI producers wishing to use the Thai GI logo. One
interviewee noted that Thai GIs which are registered as PDO/PGI in the EU
must always pass external control by a certification body under the ISO 17065
standard.362 The interviewee noted that “when we register GI in the European
Union, we allow only – because we are different and we understand that – we
allow only Thai producers who can pass the control system by external control
to be able to use the EU logo on your package”.363 In contrast, the interviewee
indicated that local GIs which are not registered in the EU are only controlled
by a Provincial Committee and not by private certification bodies due to the
substantially higher costs of private certification.364 Similarly, Marie-Vivien
andVagneron suggest that private certification is no control option whichThai
producers would easily adopt, because “[…] certification requires an entirely
different attitude by the farmers, as they not only need to do things differently,
but must also be able to prove that they actually do so. Experience in the four
countries [Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos] shows that it is often dif-
ficult for farmers and local communities to cope with the detailed technical
requirements and to understand the need to “write what they do and do what
they write” on a regular basis, as is often requested. This is likely to be the case
for GI products that need to be traced from the farm to the fork. It may also be
difficult for farmers to understand and follow the application process without
external support (e.g., from an NGO) and in the absence of properly trained
extension officers”.365
Hence, as Canavari et al. argue, “[t]he main reason that has motivated
GI associations to require for external certification relies on their willingness
to apply for registration in Europe”.366 This seems to support the assumption
of the Brussels Effect theory that producers adopt the higher standards of EU
GI control to access the EU market, although these standards would not be





365 Marie-Vivien & Vagneron, World Food Pol i c y , 121 (2017).
366 Canavari, et al., 54. 2010.
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producers who have adopted external control by a private certification body
apply these standards not only to the foreign market but also to the local mar-
ket.367 Against the initial expectation, the EU’s standards of GI control might
hence even be non-divisible and all five of the conditions for Brussels Effect
identified by Anu Bradford would be met.368
According to the Brussels Effect theory, the presence of a de facto Brus-
sels Effect is followed by a de jure Brussels Effect. The theory holds that firms
who have adopted the EU’s more stringent standards for their entire produc-
tion lobby their national government to change domestic regulations in order
to avoid a competitive disadvantage on the domestic market where more le-
nient standards prevail.369 The analysis of the EU/German and the Thai GI
control systems has shown that fundamental differences between the regula-
tory approaches towards GI control exist in terms of the institutional respon-
sibilities and the purpose of implementing GI controls. The results further
suggest that the regulatory standards for GI control in Thailand are currently
more lenient than those stipulated in EU/German law, as controls are not im-
plemented on all GIs. Furthermore, considering the unclear role of the Provin-
cial Committee as either an internal or external control body, the standards for
external control appear to be less stringent in Thailand than in the EU. All in
all, the findings hence do not support the presence of a de jure Brussels Effect.
The absence of a de jure Brussels Effect is an interesting finding considering
that the EU and Thailand principally share the same philosophy concerning
GI protection. It could thus be expected that Thailand is striving for standards
of control similar to those of the EU. There are several possible reasons for the
absence of a de jure Brussels Effect.
Firstly, only four Thai GIs are currently registered as PDO/PGI in the
EU. Consequently, relative to the total number of Thai GI producers, a very
limited number of producers have adopted the EU’s standards for GI control.
This goes with limited power to lobby the Thai government to change national
laws on GI controls. Secondly, GIs are becoming popular and are increasingly
institutionalized across thewhole ofAsia. One interviewee noted that “GI right
now is moving across Asia. So, producers are not only considering anymore
to sell and to be protected in [the] Western market but also to be protected
in [the] Asian market“.370 The emergence of alternative markets for GIs with
possiblymore lenient standards for control than those of the EUmight deprive
the EU’s market of some attractiveness for Thai producers. Thirdly, it is likely
that GIs are not very well-known among the majority of Thai producers which
is why they are probably not striving for higher standards for GI protection
367 Interviewwith a representative of theUNFAORegional Office for Asia and the Pacific (Oct.
18, 2018).
368 Bradford, Northwe st ern Un iv er s i t y L aw Rev i ew , 10-19 (2012).
369 Id. at, 6.
370 Interviewwith a representative of theUNFAORegional Office for Asia and the Pacific (Oct.
18, 2018).
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and GI control. Finally, it seems plausible that since GIs are a relatively new
regulatory field in Thailand, current differences in the regulatory approach to
GI controls stem from a lack of experience with how GIs should be controlled
when the regulatory framework for GIs was first drafted, a lack of institutional
capacity and experience in implementing controls, or the fact that the Thai
control system is not fully developed yet.
In view of the Brussels Effect theory, the Thai approach to GI protec-
tion and control furthermore renders it necessary to reconsider the assumption
that a de jure Brussels Effect is motivated by firms from “below”. Contrary to
this assumption, the further regulation and institutionalization of GI controls
in Thailand may be of greater interest for the Thai government than for the GI
producers themselves. In countries with a relatively short history of GI protec-
tion, the role of the state in implementing GIs is typically more pronounced
than in the EU where GI systems are often run by producer associations.371
In fact, theThai government (Ministry ofCommerce) is themaindriver
of the further development and implementation of a GI control system, and
there has been an exchange with stakeholders from European countries (e.g.
France) in the course of its development.372 Consequently, it seems that ef-
forts to achieve a convergence of laws might ultimately be driven “top-down”
by the government and not “bottom-up” by GI producers who have registered
their products in the EU. Bradford argues that some developing country gov-
ernments welcome the extra-territorialization of EU law because it “presents
[them] with an opportunity to outsource their regulatory pursuits to a more
resourceful agency”.373 For the regulation of GI controls in Thailand it further
seems possible that the Thai government actively encourages this effect be-
cause it hopes that internationally recognized standards for GI controls might
ultimately benefit the development of the national economy.
VI I I Conclu s i on s and l im i tat i on s
Developing countries which promote the protection of GIs increasingly also
seek the registration of their domestic GI products abroad. The EU is con-
sidered a lucrative export market for GI products due to its high standards of
protection. However, to achieve and maintain GI registration in the EU, for-
eign producers have to meet the requirements for GI control stipulated in EU
371 T. Kizos, et al., The Governance of Geographical Indications: Experiences of Practical
Implementation of Selected Case Studies in Austria, Italy, Greece and Japan, 119 Br i t i sh
Food Journal , 2875 (2017); B. Pick, et al., The Use of Geographical Indications in
Vietnam: APromisingTool for SocioeconomicDevelopment?, inGeograph i ca l Ind i -
cat i on s at the Cro s sroad s of Trade , Deve lopment, and
Culture . Fo cu s on As ia - Pac i f i c 306, (I. Calboli & N.-L. Wee-Loon eds.,
2017); Canavari, et al., 34-35. 2010.
372 Interview with a representative of the DIP Thailand (Nov. 21, 2018).
373 Bradford, Northwe st ern Un iv er s i t y L aw Rev i ew , 53 (2012).
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law. This raises the question to what extent EU legal requirements influence
GI control systems in third countries.
Focusing on Thailand and on GIs for agricultural products and food-
stuffs, this article has examined three research questions: First, how are GI
controls for agricultural products and foodstuffs regulated in the EU and in
Thailand? Second, how are GI controls for agricultural products and food-
stuffs implemented in practice in the EU and in Thailand, for the latter case
for products which are registered as PDO/PGI under EU law? Third, to what
extent is the regulation and practical implementation of GI controls for agri-
cultural products and foodstuffs inThailand shaped by EUGI regulations? We
examined these questions in light of the concept of the Brussels Effect and took
an interdisciplinary socio-legal comparative methodological approach, apply-
ing the functional method of comparative law, expert interviews and desk re-
search. The analysis was further based on three case studies of products from
the EU/Germany (i.e. Hessischer Handkäse) and Thailand (i.e. Khao Hom
Mali Thung Kula Rong-Hai (TKR) and Kafae Doi Chaang) which are regis-
tered as PGI in the EU.
Our findings suggest that the EU and theThai regulation of GI controls
is strikingly different in several respects. While in the EU, GI controls are in-
stitutionally embedded within the broader framework of food quality policy
and food law, in Thailand GI controls are the responsibility of the Ministry
of Commerce’s Department of Intellectual Property. In the EU, GI controls
are a necessary requirement for the registration of a product as PDO/PGI and
are implemented to verify the rightful use of both the registered name and
the EU PDO/PGI symbols. They are hence a crucial element of EU GI regu-
lations. In Thailand, GI controls are no requirement for the registration of a
name and are merely required for the use of the Thai GI logo. Consequently,
not all registered GIs are subject to control. Thus, the Thai standards for con-
trol are arguably more lenient than the EU’s. The findings do not seem support
the presence of a de-jure Brussels Effect.
The analysis of theGerman and theThai case studies has shown that the
GI control governance structures are different in each case (i.e. public and/or
private controls), but that all are based on the different control options stip-
ulated in the applicable laws. The control measures taken are similar in all
cases. A double layer of external control implemented in the case of Kafae Doi
Chaang as well as findings beyond the level of the case studies suggests that
Thai GIs which are registered as PDO/PGI in the EU adopt control by a for-
eign private certification body even if a local public control body is available.
Consequently, it appears that Thai producers who wish to receive GI registra-
tion in the EU comply with the EU’s higher standards for control to gain access
to the EU’s market. The findings therefore tentatively indicate the presence of
a de facto Brussels Effect.
Our findings support the hypothesis by Marie-Vivien and Vagneron
that EU GI regulations influence national GI control systems in South-East
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Asian countries which are seeking to export their products to the EU, but that
they are also influenced by costs and the financial and human resources avail-
able on the institutional and the producer levels.374 Despite various differences
on the regulatory level, the set-up of the Thai GI control system suggests sim-
ilarities with the EU’s which enable Thai producers to meet the control stan-
dards stipulated in EU law (i.e. private certification). At the same time, the con-
trol system includes a control option (i.e. by a Provincial Committee) which
is arguably more suited to local circumstances than private certification. The
findings of our research further suggest that in practice, the chosen control
options differ between GIs sold only on the national market and those which
are registered and sold as PDO/PGI in the EU. Although Marie-Vivien and
Vagneron advocate the implementation of “tailor-made” instead of “one-size-
fits-all” control systems for these countries375, it is questionable whether such
“tailor-made” control systemsmeet international standards forGI control. This
can put their value for countries striving to protect and sell their GIs on foreign
markets into question. Furthermore, the need for Thai GI producers who reg-
istered their products as PDO/PGI in the EU to resort to control by private
certification bodies may point to the absence of a public control mechanism
which meets the EU’s standards for public control. This is line with the argu-
ment made by Justin Hughes who emphasizes that developing country govern-
ments often lack the capacity or the will to effectively enforce GI laws.376
In light of the outcome of the WTO dispute, in which the US and Aus-
tralia challenged the strict requirements which the EU’s GI control system
placed on producers from third countries, the question remains whether the
amendments subsequently made by the EU really make it easier for foreign
producers to achieve GI registration in the EU. In this regard, the findings sug-
gest that in practice the EU’s provisions do not allow for easy access of third
country GIs, especially from developing countries. Despite the existence of
a public control mechanism, Thai producers are left with private certification
as the only viable control option. This requires financial, technical and hu-
man resources which producers from developing countries may not be able to
raise. Besides, it requires that certification bodies which are qualified to meet
the EU’s standards for certification are present in the country of origin in the
first place and are affordable for GI producers.377 The analysis has shown that
this issue raised byMarette et al. materialized inThailand, where no ISO 17065-
accredited certification body exists and certification therefore has to be carried
out by foreign certification bodies.
Our research is subject to several limitations. Limitations regarding the
functional method of comparative law arise from the fact that a cross-cultural
comparison of two different regulatory systems was conducted. The EU is
374 Marie-Vivien & Vagneron, World Food Pol i c y , 121 (2017).
375 Id. at, 105.
376 Hughes, 131-134. 2009.
377 Marette, et al., Agr i bu s i n e s s , 466 (2008).
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a multi-level regulatory system, while Thailand is a constitutional monarchy,
which implies that the structures of the legal systems compared are different.378
Besides, each judicial system is influenced by its unique political, social, cul-
tural and historical setting, which requires full comprehension and in-depth
knowledge about it on part of the researcher to reach valid conclusions.379 Sim-
ilarly, pitfalls related to working with legal texts and documents in a language
unknown to the researchers were encountered.380
Shortcomings in relation to conducting expert interviews arose from
the fact that the German andThai experts whichwere interviewed are involved
in the respective GI control systems to a different extent. The main reasons
for this distinction were the limited possibilities of data access and language
barriers which arose for the Thai cases.
Moreover, we did not make the selection of the case studies based on
theoretical considerations but on reasons of data access and data availability.
Since the products are all different product types with inherently different char-
acteristics and production procedures, their level of comparability concerning
quality control measures is limited. The findings for the case of Hessischer
Handkäse in Germany are furthermore not representative for the whole of
Germany, let alone the entire EU. Related, this research faces shortcomings
due to its qualitative nature and the case study approach taken. Despite the
triangulation of different research methods, the results attained through a lim-
ited number of expert interviews and small-N case study research is valid and
generalizable only to a limited extent.381 The research findings are rather spec-
ulative in nature and the research approach taken and the results obtained do
not allow to prove any causal connections between the investigated variables.382
Future qualitative research should hence extend the analysis to a larger
number of cases of Thai GIs which are registered as PDO/PGI in the EU. Ide-
ally, to enhance the validity of the results, the relationship between EU GI con-
trol regulations and the behavior of Thai producers should be examined using
quantitative methods. The impact of the adoption of the EU’s GI control sys-
tem on producers in developing countries like Thailand should be quantified
to understand which costs and benefits producers from third countries face
when adopting the EU’s control standards, and which incentives are needed to
achieve that more producers from developing countries apply for GI registra-
tion in the EU.
378 Van Hoecke, L aw and Method , 10 (2015).
379 Örücü, 450. 2006.
380 Id. at.
381 L amnek & Kre l l , 690. 2016.
382 Mahy, In t ernat ional Journal of L aw in Context , 430-431 (2016).
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I X Append i c e s
Appendix A: Pictures of PGI certified Hessischer Handkäse, TKR and Kafae Doi
Chaang
Hessischer Handkäse
Source: Photograph by the authors.
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Kao Hom Mali Thung Kula Rong-Hai (TKR)
Source: Orachos Napasintuwong 383
383 Napasintuwong, Khao Hom Mali Thung Kula Rong-Hai. 2018.
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Kafae Doi Chaang
Source: https://doichaangcoffee.co.th/en/products/coffee-bean/
3 Sep 2020] THE BRUSSELS EFFECT IN ACTION 59
Appendix B: List of interviewees
Interviewee Date of the interview
Representative of UN FAO Regional Of-




(IP 2 and 3)
19. October 2018
Auditors RP Giessen (IP 4 and 5) 24. October 2018
Researcher Strength2Food project (IP 6) 5. November 2018
Representative DIP Thailand (IP 7) 21. November 2018
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Appendix C: Interview guides
I. Interview guide Regierungspräsidium Giessen (in German)
Fragen zum System der amtlichen Kontrolle geschützter Herkunfts-
bezeichnungen in Hessen – Regierungspräsidium Giessen
Akteure und Zuständigkeiten
1) Welche Rolle hat das Regierungspräsidium Giessen in Bezug auf die
amtliche Kontrolle geschützter Herkunftsbezeichnungen in Hessen?
2) Welche anderenAkteure sind anKontrollen geschützterHerkunftsbeze-
ichnungen inHessen beteiligt undwelcheAufgabenübernehmendiese?
Ablauf und Inhalt amtlicher Kontrollen
Hier wäre es gut vorstellbar, Frage 3 und 4 am Beispiel des Hessischen
Handkäs‘ zu erläutern
3) Wie wird bei der Überprüfung der Einhaltung der Produktspezifika-
tion vor Inverkehrbringen des Erzeugnisses (Inspektion) vorgegangen?
a. Wiehäufigundwannwird eineKontrolle durchgeführt? (Angekündigt,
unangekündigt?)
b. Wie lange dauert die Kontrolle?
c. Wer führt die Kontrolle durch?
d. Wer wird im Zuge der Kontrolle kontrolliert?
e. Wie sieht das Kontrollkonzept für die Kontrolle der Einhaltung
der Produktspezifikation für den Hessischen Handkäs‘ aus?
f. Welche Aspekte genau werden bei der Kontrolle der Einhaltung
der Produktspezifikation kontrolliert? Wie werden diese Aspekte
kontrolliert (Methoden)? Vonwemwerden die jeweiligenAspekte
kontrolliert? Wann werden die jeweiligen Aspekte kontrolliert?
Sind kritische Punkte bzgl. jeder Vorgabe festgelegt, an denen die
Kontrolle stattfinden soll?
i. EinhaltungderVorgabender Produktspezifikation, z.B. zuHer-
stellung der Rohmaterialien und Verarbeitungsprozesse
ii. Rückverfolgbarkeit der Herkunft der Zutaten
iii. Endprodukt, z.B. Labelling, Verpackung, Geschmack
g. In welchem Verhältnis steht die Kontrolle zur Einhaltung der Pro-
duktspezifikation mit der Überprüfung der Einhaltung anderer
Standards? (Wie wird in diesem Fall die Kontrolle für die Einhal-
tung der Produktspezifikation der g.g.A. durchgeführt? Separate
Kontrollen, gleiche Leute, separate Dokumentation und Berichter-
stattung?)
3 Sep 2020] THE BRUSSELS EFFECT IN ACTION 61
h. Gibt es Aspekte, im Hinblick derer sich die Überprüfung der Ein-
haltungder Produktspezifikation als schwierig gestaltet? Wie gehen
Sie damit um?
4) Wie wird bei den Kontrollen vorgegangen, die nach Inverkehrbringen
des Erzeugnisses auf dem Markt durchgeführt werden (amtliche Kon-
trolle auf dem Markt)?
a. Wiehäufigundwannundwird eineKontrolle durchgeführt? (Angekündigt,
unangekündigt)
b. Wie lange dauert die Kontrolle?
c. Wer führt die Kontrolle durch?
d. Wer wird im Zuge der Kontrolle kontrolliert?
i. Supermärkte, Restaurants, Spezialitätengeschäfte, Bauernmärkte
etc.
e. WelcheAspekte genauwerdenbei derKontrolle nach Inverkehrbrin-
gen auf denMarkt kontrolliert? Wiewerden dieseAspekte kontrol-
liert (Methoden: Dokumente, Laboranalyse etcl.)? Von wem wer-
den die jeweiligen Aspekte kontrolliert? Wann werden die jeweili-
gen Aspekte kontrolliert? Sind kritische Punkte bzgl. jeder Vor-
gabe festgelegt, an denen die Kontrolle stattfinden soll?
i. Einhaltung der Vorgaben der Produktspezifikation
ii. Rückverfolgbarkeit des Produktes und korrekte Dokumenta-
tion durch Marktteilnehmer
iii. Endprodukt, z.B. Labelling, Verpackung, Aussehen, Geschmack,
Lebensmittelsicherheit
f. In welchem Verhältnis steht die Kontrolle nach Inverkehrbringen
des Erzeugnisses mit der Überprüfung der Einhaltung anderer
Standards? (Wie wird in diesem Fall die Kontrolle für die g.g.A.
durchgeführt? Separate Kontrollen, gleiche Leute, separate Doku-
mentation und Berichterstattung?
g. Gibt esAspekte, imHinblick derer sich dieÜberprüfung als schwierig
gestaltet? Wie gehen Sie damit um?
5) Gibt es Unterschiede zwischen den verschiedenen hessischen Produk-
tenmit geschützterHerkunftsbezeichnung imHinblick auf die angewen-
deten Kontrollverfahren?
a. Gibt esUnterschiede zwischendenKontroll- undÜberwachungsmech-
anismen, die für geschützte geographische Angaben bzw. für
geschützte Ursprungsbezeichnungen angewendet werden?
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Dokumentation und Berichterstattung
6) Wie werden die Ergebnisse der Inspektionen und der amtlichen Kon-
trollen auf dem Markt dokumentiert?
7) Wie und bei wem wird Bericht darüber erstattet?
a. Welche Rolle spielen dabei regionale Behörden, Behörden des Lan-
des Hessen, nationale Behörden oder EU Behörden?
b. Wie werden die Ergebnisse in den mehrjährigen nationalen Kon-
trollplan integriert?
Durchsetzungsmaßnahmen
8) Welche Maßnahmen werden ergriffen, wenn bei der Inspektion der
Einhaltung der Produktspezifikation Verstöße aufgedeckt werden?
9) Wiewird vorgegangen, wenndermissbräuchlicheGebrauch eines geschützten
Namens auf demMarkt aufgedeckt wird?
Kosten
10) Welche Kosten entstehen bei Inspektionen und amtlichen Kontrollen
auf dem Markt? Wer trägt diese Kosten?
a. Indirekte Kosten: z.B. Zeit zum Ausfüllen von Dokumenten, Anwesen-
heit bei Inspektionen
b. DirekteKosten: z.B.KostenderKontrolle, technischeKosten (z.B. chemis-
che Analysen)
Kontrolle der zuständigen Behörde
11) Unterliegen die Kontrolltätigkeiten des Regierungspräsidiums auch in-
ternen oder externen Kontrollen?
II. Interview guide DIP Thailand (in English)
Interview questions on the control system for geographical indica-
tions – Department of Intellectual PropertyThailand
Development
1) How did the system of GI controls in Thailand evolve?
a. To what extent is/has the development of the GI control system
in Thailand been influenced by systems of GI controls in place in
other countries?
Actors and Responsibilities
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2) Which role does theDepartment of Intellectual Property have regarding
the control of geographical indications in Thailand?
3) Which other actors play a role in the control system and which respon-
sibilities do they have?
Implementation of GI controls
4) How is the compliance of the GI product with the product specification
ensured?
5) How is the rightful use of the protected name controlled after a product
has been placed on the market?
6) To what extent does the implementation of controls differ for different
products?
a. How are controls carried out for products which are reg-
istered as protected designation of origin (PDO) or pro-
tected geographical indications (PGI) in the European
Union (EU)?
Applicable to questions 4, 5 and 6:
b. How frequently and when are controls conducted (announced, unan-
nounced)?
c. How long does a control take?
d. Who is being controlled?
e. Which aspects exactly are being controlled? How are they controlled
(methods)? Who controls the different aspects? When are the different
aspects controlled? Are critical points defined which the controls focus
on?
i. Compliance with product specification, e.g. concerning produc-
tion of raw materials or processing
ii. Traceability
iii. Final product, e.g. labelling, packaging, taste
Documentation and Reporting
7) How are the results of the control of compliance with the product spec-
ification and controls after the product has been placed on the market
documented?
8) How and to whom are they reported?
Enforcement and sanctions
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9) What happens if non-compliance is revealed during a control of com-
pliance with the product specification or a control after the product has
been placed on the market?
Costs
10) What are the costs associated with the control of compliance with the
product specification and controls after the product has been placed on
the market?
III. Interview guide experts on Thai GI control system (in English)
Interview questions expertsThailand
Introduction
1) To what extent is your project engaging with the topic of GI controls in
Thailand?
Development of the GI control system
2) How did the system of GI controls in Thailand evolve?
a. Since when was a system of GI controls established in
Thailand?
b. Why did a system of GI controls develop in Thailand al-
though controls are not legally required by the Thai GI
Act?
c. Which actors influence(d) the establishment of the con-
trol system?
d. To what extent is/has the development of GI controls in
Thailand been influenced by systems of GI controls in
place in other countries? E.g. the EU system for GI con-
trols?
Organisation of the GI control system
3) Which actors are part of the control system for GIs in Thailand at the
moment? Which responsibilities do these actors have?
a. GI Commission
b. Department of Intellectual Property Rights
c. Accreditation Bodies (National Accreditation Council)
d. Competent authorities (Provincial Committee)
e. Control Bodies
f. Producer groups
3 Sep 2020] THE BRUSSELS EFFECT IN ACTION 65
g. Producers
4) To what extent are the actors involved in the controls supervised and
controlled themselves? How are they controlled?
Implementation of GI controls
5) How are GI controls in Thailand implemented at the moment?
a. How is compliance of a GI product with the product
specification ensured?
b. How is the rightful use of the protected name controlled
after a product has been placed on the market?
c. How frequently are controls conducted?
d. How are control results documented and reported? To
whom?
e. What enforcement mechanisms are in place? Which
sanctions for non-compliance exist?
f. What are the costs associated with controls? Who bears
the costs?
6) To what extent does the prospect of accessing international markets
influence the implementation of GI controls by producers?
7) What is the relation between GI controls and food safety controls in
Thailand?
Prevailing issues of GI controls
8) What are prevailing issues in the regulation, governance and implemen-
tation of GI controls in Thailand?
9) To what extent are issues related to the compliance with international
standards regarding external controls?
IV. Interview guide producers Hessischer Handkäse (in German)
Leitfragen für Interviewsmit Produzenten desHessischenHandkäs’
Einführung
1) Was macht den Hessischen Handkäs‘ aus Ihrer Sicht zu einem beson-
derenProdukt undwarumhat Ihr Betrieb/ haben Sie sich dazu entschieden,
Ihr Produkt unter den Bestimmungen des Siegels „geschützte geografis-
che Angabe“ zu produzieren?
Akteure der Kontrollen
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1) Vonwemwird in IhremBetrieb kontrolliert, ob der von Ihnenhergestellte
Hessische Handkäs‘ den Vorgaben der Produktspezifikation entspricht?
Was für Aufgaben übernehmen die Akteure jeweils?
Ablauf und Inhalt der Kontrolle
Je nach Antwort auf Frage 2) bezieht sich die folgende Frage 3) auf Selb-
stkontrollen, interne Kontrollen durch Produzentenverbände und externe Kon-
trollen, die zur Verifizierung der Einhaltung der Produktspezifikation durchge-
führt werden.
2) Wie ist derAblauf und Inhalt der Kontrolle zur Einhaltung der Produk-
tspezifikation für den Hessischen Handkäs‘?
a. Wiehäufigundwannwird eineKontrolle durchgeführt? (Angekündigt,
unangekündigt?)
b. Wie lange dauert die Kontrolle?
c. Wer wird im Zuge der Kontrolle kontrolliert?
d. Wie sieht das Kontrollkonzept für die Kontrolle der Einhaltung
der Produktspezifikation für den Hessischen Handkäs‘ aus?
e. Welche Aspekte genau werden bei der Kontrolle der Einhaltung
der Produktspezifikation kontrolliert? Wie werden diese Aspekte
kontrolliert (Methoden)? Vonwemwerden die jeweiligenAspekte
kontrolliert? Wann werden die jeweiligen Aspekte kontrolliert?
Sind kritische Punkte bzgl. jeder Vorgabe festgelegt, an denen die
Kontrolle stattfinden soll?
i. EinhaltungderVorgabender Produktspezifikation, z.B. zuHer-
stellung der Rohmaterialien und Verarbeitungsprozesse
ii. Rückverfolgbarkeit der Herkunft der Zutaten
iii. Endprodukt, z.B. Labelling, Verpackung, Geschmack
3) In welchem Verhältnis steht die Kontrolle zur Einhaltung der Produkt-
spezifikation mit der Überprüfung der Einhaltung anderer Standards?
a. Wie wird in diesem Fall die Kontrolle für die Einhaltung der Pro-
duktspezifikation der g.g.A. durchgeführt? Separate Kontrollen,
gleiche Leute, separate Dokumentation und Berichterstattung?
4) Gibt es Aspekte, imHinblick derer sich die Überprüfung der Einhaltung
der Produktspezifikation als schwierig gestaltet?
Dokumentation und Berichterstattung
5) Wie werden die Ergebnisse der Kontrolle dokumentiert?
6) Wem und wie wird über die Ergebnisse der Kontrolle Bericht erstattet?
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Verstöße
7) Was würde passieren, wenn bei der Kontrolle dieNicht-Einhaltung der
Vorgaben der Produktspezifikation entdeckt würde?
Kosten
8) Welche Kosten entstehen bei der Kontrolle und wer trägt diese Kosten?
a. IndirekteKosten: z.B. Zeit zumAusfüllen vonDokumenten,
Anwesenheit bei Inspektionen
b. Direkte Kosten: z.B. Kosten der Zertifizierung, technis-
che Kosten (z.B. chemische Analysen)
V. Interview guide expert Doi Chaang coffee (in English)
Interview questions for expertsThailand – Doi Chaang coffee case
Introduction
1) How did the system of GI controls in Thailand evolve?
a. To what extent is/has the development of the GI control system
in Thailand been influenced by systems of GI controls in place in
other countries?
2) How is the system of GI control organised in Thailand?
a. How is compliance of aGI productwith theproduct spec-
ification ensured?
b. How is the rightful use of the protected name controlled
after a product has been placed on the market?
c. What enforcement mechanisms are in place? Which
sanctions for non-compliance exist?
Questions 3 to 11 refer to the case of Doi Chaang coffee.
Implementation of GI controls for Doi Chaang coffee
3) How are self-controls by Doi Chaang coffee growers carried out?
4) How are internal controls of the Doi Chaang coffee growers and the
Kafae Doi Chaang Company by the GI Committee at Provincial Level
carried out?
How are external controls of the Doi Chaang coffee growers and the
Kafae Doi Chaang Company by the control body carried out?
Applicable to questions 3, 4 and 5:
a. How frequently and when are controls conducted (announced, unan-
nounced)?
68 CAMPUS KULMBACH LEGAL WORKING PAPERS [№ 2/20
b. How long does a control take?
c. Who is being controlled?
d. How does the control plan look like for Doi Chaang coffee?
e. Which aspects exactly are being controlled? How are they controlled
(methods)? Who controls the different aspects? When are the different
aspects controlled? Are critical points defined which the controls focus
on?
i. Compliance with product specification, e.g. concerning produc-
tion of raw materials or processing
ii. Traceability
iii. Final product, e.g. labelling, packaging, taste
5) Towhat extent are self-, internal and external controls related to controls
of other standards?
6) Are there aspects which are difficult to control? Which?
Documentation and reporting for Doi Chaang coffee
7) How are the results of self-, internal and external controls documented
in the case of Doi Chaang coffee?
8) Whom and how are the results of self-, internal and external controls
reported to in the case of Doi Chaang coffee?
Enforcement and sanctions for Doi Chaang coffee
9) What happens when non-compliance is revealed during a self-, internal
or external control?
Costs
10) What are the costs associated with self-, internal and external controls
of Doi Chaang coffee? Who bears the costs?
a. Indirect costs: Time needed to fil out documents, pres-
ence at inspections etc.
b. Direct costs: costs of control, technical costs (e.g. chem-
ical analysis)
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Appendix D: Steps of a structured content analysis adapted from Mayring384
384 Mayr ing , 98, 104. 2015.
70 CAMPUS KULMBACH LEGAL WORKING PAPERS [№ 2/20







Development Statements relating to
the history of the de-
velopment of the con-












to the actors which
are part of the control






























eral, not the case
study
385 Id. at, 97-99.




Issues Statements relating to










Development Statements related to
the history of the de-
velopment of the con-





















to the actors which
are part of the control






















ring to how Thai
products which
are registered as
GIs in the EU are
controlled











eral, not the case
study
Issues Statements relating to
problems of the con-










Self-control Actors Refers to control ac-
tivities which are car-
ried out by members

















Actors Refers to control ac-
tivities carried out by
GI producer organi-















Actors Refers to control ac-
tivities carried out by
public and/or private
third parties



























Self-control Actors Refers to control ac-
tivities which are car-
ried out by members















Actors Refers to the control
activities carried out
by GI producer orga-











Actors Refers to control ac-
























3 Sep 2020] THE BRUSSELS EFFECT IN ACTION 75
Appendix F: Comparison of regulation of GI controls in the EU/Germany and
in Thailand
EU/Germany Thailand
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EU/Germany Thailand
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EU/Germany Thailand
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Appendix G: Comparison of governance of GI controls for the German and Thai
case studies
Hessischer Handkäse TKR Kafae Doi Chaang
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Hessischer Handkäse TKR Kafae Doi Chaang
External
control
Public control by
the competent
authority (RP
Giessen)
• Focus on
compliance
with product
specification,
traceability,
quality
assurance
and running
of
self-controls
Private control by
ISO 17065-
accredited
certification body
(Bioagricert)
• Focus on
compliance
with
working
manual,
traceability,
running of
self-controls
and internal
controls
Private control by
ISO 17065-
accredited
certification body
(Bioagricert)
• Focus on
compliance
with
working
manual,
(traceabil-
ity), running
of
self-controls,
running of
Provincial
Committee
controls
